Third-Party Consent to Search: Analyzing Triangular Relations by Gan, Orit
Gan Macro Edit_v2_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2012 5:00 PM 
 
303 
Third-Party Consent to Search: Analyzing Triangular Relations  
ORIT GAN* 
How does the law construct consent? This Article explores this question in the 
context of Supreme Court decisions regarding third-party consent to searches of 
dwellings. Using textual analysis, a method rarely used in Fourth Amendment law, this 
Article argues that the Supreme Court employs an a-contextual and gender-blind 
analysis of consent that is insensitive to power dynamics. Using the feminist scholarship 
on consent, this Article critiques the notion of consent as developed by the Supreme 
Court. At the same time it rejects the feminist redefinition of consent as vague and 
unclear. 
This Article proposes that the third-party consent to search doctrine involves a 
triangular relation between the police officer, the consenting third-party, and the suspect. 
Accordingly, this Article explores each edge of the triangle.  This triangular relation 
analysis shows that the problematic notion of consent is more acute in third-party 
consent cases than in other consensual search cases. Thus, this Article proposes the 
abolition of the third-party consent to search doctrine. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cases of third-party consent to search of the home are a drama with three 
participants: the police officer, the consenting third-party, and the suspect or 
defendant.  Consider, for example, the facts of the Supreme Court case, Georgia v. 
Randolph.1  Janet Randolph called the police to complain about a domestic 
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 1.  547 U.S. 103 (2006).  For literature on this case, see Monique N. Bhargava, Protecting Privacy 
in a Shared Castle: The Implications of Georgia v. Randolph for the Third-Party Consent Doctrine, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1009 (2008); James M. Binnall, He’s on Parole . . . But You Still Can’t Come In: A Parolee’s 
Reaction to Georgia v. Randolph, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y, 341 (2006); C. Dan Black, Georgia 
v. Randolph: A Murky Refinement of the Fourth Amendment Third-Party Consent Doctrine, 42 GONZ. L. 
REV. 321 (2006); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meera Adya & Jacqueline Mogle, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Privacy: Testing Lay ‘Expectations of Privacy,’ 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331 (2009); Joshua Brannon, Georgia 
v. Randolph: An Exception to Co-Occupant Consent Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 531 (2006); Tim Buskirk, Constitutional Law: The Reasonableness Requirement and Fourth Amendment 
Boundaries to Co-Occupant Consent: Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 475 (2007); George M. Dery, III. & Michael J. Hernandez, Blissful Ignorance? The Supreme Court’s 
Signal to Police in Georgia v. Randolph to Avoid Seeking Consent to Search from All Occupants of a Home, 
40 CONN. L. REV. 53 (2007); Shane E. Eden, Picking the Matlock: Georgia v. Randolph and the U.S. 
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dispute she had with her husband.2  When Sergeant Murray came to the 
Randolphs’ home, Ms. Randolph told him that Mr. Randolph was a drug user.3  
Sergeant Murray also learned that Ms. Randolph had returned to the family’s 
dwelling after taking their son to her parents’ home in Canada.4  After their 
return, Mr. Randolph took their son to their neighbors’ house to prevent Ms. 
Randolph from taking him away again.5  Sergeant Murray asked Mr. Randolph’s 
permission to search the Randolphs’ house and Mr. Randolph refused.6  After 
Mr. Randolph’s refusal, Ms. Randolph readily gave her consent to search the 
house.7  Evidence of drug abuse was found in the search and was later used 
against Mr. Randolph in a court of law.8 
This scenario was full of dramatic tensions: first was the tension between 
Mr. Randolph and Ms. Randolph.  The couple had a domestic dispute so severe 
that Ms. Randolph felt the need for police intervention.9  They disagreed about 
whether to let the police search the house.10  They also had conflicting interests: 
Mr. Randolph had an interest in hiding evidence of his drug use from the police 
while Ms. Randolph had an interest in having the police intervene in the 
domestic dispute she had with her husband.11  Second, there was a tension 
 
Supreme Court’s Re-Examination of Third-Party-Consent Authority in Light of Social Expectations, 52 S.D. L. 
REV. 171 (2007); Kyle Evans, There Is No Place Like Home: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Allow Searches 
of the Home Based on Disputed Consent in Georgia v. Randolph, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 627 (Fall 2007); Jason 
M. Ferguson, Randolph v. Georgia: The Beginning of a New Era in Third-Party Consent Cases, 31 NOVA 
L. REV. 605 (2007); Stephanie M. Godfrey & Kay Levine, Supreme Court Review Much Ado About 
Randolph: The Supreme Court Revisits Third Party Consent, 42 TULSA L. REV. 731 (Spring 2007); 
Nicholas S. Hines, The Fourth Amendment’s Consent to Entry Exception: Protecting the Castle from the Co-
Tenant’s Consent, 11 JONES L. REV. 117 (2007); Nathan S. Lew, Nothing to be Worried About: Consent 
Searches After Georgia v. Randolph, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 1067 (Spring 2007); Marc McAllister, What 
The High Court Giveth The Lower Courts Taketh Away: How to Prevent Undue Scrutiny of Police Officer 
Motivations Without Eroding Randolph’s Heightened Fourth Amendment Protections, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
663 (2008); Lesley McCall, Georgia v. Randolph: Whose Castle Is It, Anyway?, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 589 
(2007); Madeline E. McNeeley, Constitutional Law–Search and Seizure–Validity of Consent to Warrantless 
Search of Residence When Co-Occupant Expressly Objects, 74 TENN. L. REV. 259 (Winter 2007); Daniel E. 
Pulliam, Post-Georgia v. Randolph: An Opportunity to Rethink the Reasonableness of Third-Party Consent 
Searches Under the Fourth Amendment, 43 IND. L. REV. 237 (2009); Matthew W. J. Webb, Third-Party 
Consent Searches After Randolph: The Circuit Split Over Police Removal of an Objecting Tenant, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3371 (2009); Alissa C. Wetzel, Georgia v. Randolph: A Jealously Guarded Exception—
Consent and the Fourth Amendment, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 499 (Fall 2006); Adrienne Wineholt, Georgia v. 
Randolph: Checking Potential Defendants’ Fourth Amendment Rights at the Door, 66 MD. L. REV. 475 
(2007); Nathan A. Wood, Georgia v. Randolph: What to do With a Yes from One but not from Two?, 58 
MERCER L. REV. 1429 (2007); Jason E. Zakai, You Say Yes, But Can I Say No?: The Future of Third-Party 
Consent Searches After Georgia v. Randolph, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 421 (2007). 
 2.  547 U.S. at 107. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See id. 
 10.  See id. 
 11.  See id. 
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between Ms. Randolph and Sergeant Murray.  The police officer was in a 
position of authority relative to Ms. Randolph, and he requested to intrude into 
the privacy of Ms. Randolph’s home.12  Even though she called the police, Ms. 
Randolph’s permission was required for a state representative to enter her 
home.13  Third, there was a tension between Mr. Randolph and Sergeant Murray.  
In contrast to other cases where the objecting suspect was absent from the home, 
Mr. Randolph was physically present and voiced his objection to the search.14  
Sergeant Murray faced a disputed consent where one occupant invited him into 
the house and the other did not allow the search.15  At the same time, Mr. 
Randolph had an interest in overriding his wife’s permission to the search.16 
This Article puts this triangular drama at the center of it’s analysis of third-
party consent to search doctrine.  Following a brief description of this area of 
Fourth Amendment law in Part II, this Article argues that this doctrine involves a 
triangular relation between the police officer and the two co-occupants.17  In 
order to better understand these situations, this Article analyzes each edge of the 
triangle and explores the dynamics between the three players.  The relational 
dynamics between the two co-occupants are examined in Part III.  The relational 
dynamics between the police officer and the consenting occupant (the third-
party) are examined in Part IV.  The relational dynamics between the police 
officer and the suspect (or defendant) are examined in Part V. 
Applying this triangular relation analysis, this Article critiques the way the 
Supreme Court constructs the notion of consent.  It raises multiple questions.  
How does the Supreme Court examine consent?  What elements of consent are 
relevant to such an examination?  What other elements are excluded from such 
consideration?  What constitutes consent according to the Supreme Court?  To 
answer these questions I engage in textual analysis of Supreme Court cases, a 
method rarely applied in Fourth Amendment law.18 
Concentrating on the Supreme Court’s rhetoric and its analysis of consent, 
this Article argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis of consent is a-contextual 
and neutral in its language, assumptions, and implications.  It disregards power 
dynamics between the occupant and the police and between the two occupants.  
The Court’s analysis also overlooks gender, race, and other social aspects of 
consent.  Additionally, this Article argues that the Supreme Court views consent 
 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  There can be more than three people involved in a police search of a home when there are 
three or more roommates.  For the sake of simplicity, I focus on the typical case of two occupants.  In 
addition, I use the word “occupant” because this Article focuses on searches of the home, but my 
analysis is also relevant to a search of other property like cars, bags, or computers. 
 18.  For rhetoric analysis of Fourth Amendment law, see M. Isabel Medina, Exploring the Use of 
the Word “Citizen” in Writings on the Fourth Amendment, 83 IND. L.J. 1557 (2008); M. Isabel Medina, 
Ruminations on the Fourth Amendment: Case Law, Commentary, and the Word “Citizen”, 11 HARV. LATINO 
L. REV. 189 (2008); David E. Steinberg, Zealous Officers and Neutral Magistrates: The Rhetoric of the Fourth 
Amendment, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1019 (2010). 
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as: (i) an individualized process, meaning consent is unaffected by its 
circumstances and divorced from its societal context; (ii) a legitimating factor, 
meaning consent justifies the search notwithstanding the power dynamics 
between the three parties; and (iii) a private decision, meaning consent has no 
constitutional, political, or public concerns.  The Supreme Court’s analysis of 
consent revolves around three dichotomies: individual-social, equality-hierarchy, 
and private-public.  For each duality, the Supreme Court chooses the first 
category in its analysis. 
The Article’s analysis of consent relies on feminist literature on consent.  
Though feminist scholarly work on consent focuses on consent to sex,19 this 
Article finds it applicable to the issue of consent to search.  The consent to 
sex/consent to search analogy, which  is rarely used,20 will not only further our 
understanding of consent in the Fourth Amendment context, but will also 
expand the feminist analysis of consent to new territories. 
As the critical analysis of third-party consent to search in Parts III–V shows, 
the Supreme Court has developed a simplistic and problematic notion of 
consent.  However, it also shows that the feminists’ proposals to redefine or 
reconstruct consent are also problematic and vague.21  Consequently, Part VI 
supports abolition of this doctrine.  As the triangular relation analysis highlights, 
third-party consent to search cases are different than other cases of consensual 
searches.  This uniqueness makes the problematic notion of consent even more 
acute in third-party consent cases.  Thus, though eliminating all consent searches 
is radical and impractical, this article proposes a new rationale for third-party 
consent to search abolition.22 
II.  THIRD-PARTY CONSENT TO SEARCH DOCTRINE 
This Part briefly outlines Fourth Amendment law as it relates to third-party 
consent to search.  Since Fourth Amendment law is an area of enormous breadth, 
this Article limits its focus in two ways.  First, the Article only deals with search 
of the home cases.23  Second, the Article looks only to Supreme Court cases.24  
The textual analysis of these cases frequently cites to the Randolph decision.25  The 
 
 19. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking Consent in a Big Love Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER  & L. 111 
(2010). 
 20.  For the analogy between consent to search and sex, see Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: 
“Consent” Within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2010). 
 21.  See discussion infra notes 294–304 and accompanying text. 
 22.  For abolishing third-party consent to search doctrine, see Aubrey H. Brown III, Georgia v. 
Randolph, The Red-Headed Stepchild of an Ugly Family: Why Third-Party Consent Search Doctrine is an 
Unfortunate Fourth Amendment Development that Should Be Restrained, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 471 
(2009).  See also Gary K. Matthews, Third-Party Consent Searches: Some Necessary Safeguards, 10 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 29 (1976). 
 23.  Though this Article focuses on searches of a home, its analysis may also be applied to 
government’s access to information and to other property such as cars, bags, and computers. 
 24.  Since I limit my analysis to Supreme Court cases, I will not cite lower federal court decisions 
or state court decisions.  I rely in my analysis on the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
not on states’ constitutions. 
 25.  547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
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reliance on this case is for two reasons: first, Randolph is the most recent Supreme 
Court third-party consent to search decision; second, in that case the suspect was 
physically present during the search and objected to it, while in previous cases 
the suspect was absent.26  This difference makes the triangular relation more 
readily apparent.  However, even when the suspect is absent, the relation 
between the suspect and the other occupant and between the suspect and the 
police officer is still relevant.  Thus, the analysis here applies not only to Randolph 
but also to the other Supreme Court cases addressing third-party consent to 
search. 
Under Fourth Amendment law,27 consent is the most common exception to 
the general rule that the police need a search warrant or probable cause for a 
search to be reasonable and valid.28  Accordingly, a governmental agent may 
conduct a warrantless search with an individual’s consent as long as the consent 
is voluntarily given by a person authorized to give it.29  To determine whether 
consent has been voluntarily given, courts examine the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the consent.30  These circumstances may include such 
factors as the youth of the consenter, lack of education, low intelligence, and lack 
of any advisement to the consenter of his constitutional rights.31  However, 
gender and race are not considered by the courts. 
Consent to a search, according to Fourth Amendment law, may be given not 
only by the suspect but also by a third-party.32  Until Randolph the Supreme 
Court only dealt with third-party consent to search cases where the suspect was 
absent from the home during the search.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held 
that a search of a home pursuant to the voluntary consent of an occupant who 
shares common authority over the property is valid against any absent non-
consenting co-occupant.33  The common authority rule is not based on property 
interests in the home but rather on mutual use, joint access, and control of the 
property.  According to the Supreme Court’s rationale, in a search of a dwelling 
the co-occupant’s mutual use of the property through joint access or control will, 
 
 26.  See id. 
 27.  For Fourth Amendment law, see generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (4th ed., 2004); Joseph D. Robinson, Who’s That Knocking at 
Your Door?: Third Party Consents to Police Entry, 77 FLA. BAR J. 24 (2003). 
 28.  Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” But Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the 
Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005) (stating: “Over 90% of warrantless police 
searches are accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 30.  For the totality of the circumstances test, see David John Housholder, Reconciling Consent 
Searches and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Incorporating Privacy into the Test for Valid Consent 
Searches, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1279 (2005) (proposing including the expectation of privacy as a factor in 
the totality of the circumstances analysis in order to examine the validity of the consent to search). 
 31.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. 
 32.  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).  See also 
Robert Deschene, The Problem of Third-Party Consent in Fourth Amendment Searches: Toward a 
“Conservative” Reading of the Matlock Decision, 42 ME. L. REV. 159 (1990). 
 33.  See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (leaving open the question whether a 
wife can consent to a search of the home she shares with her husband). 
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for most purposes, render a search pursuant to one co-occupant’s consent 
reasonable: each has assumed the risk that the other might permit a search, and 
each has the right to give such permission.34  A person voluntarily relinquishes a 
portion of his or her expectation of privacy by sharing access or control over his 
or her property with another person.  Hence, third-party consent makes the 
search reasonable.  For example, in United States v. Matlock the Supreme Court 
considered a search of a bedroom during which $4,995 in cash was found in a 
diaper bag in a closet.35  Mr. Matlock was arrested in the yard at the time the 
police officers conducted the search pursuant to the consent of Ms. Graff, an 
individual with whom Mr. Matlock lived.  At his trial Mr. Matlock asked the 
court to suppress the money found in the search, which was used to convict him 
of robbery.36  The Supreme Court held that the search was legal.37  Because Ms. 
Graff jointly occupied a bedroom with Mr. Matlock, she had the authority to give 
consent to a police search of the bedroom.38  The Court emphasized the following 
additional facts: Ms. Graff admitted the police officers while dressed in her robe 
and holding her son in her hands; it was obvious that the couple shared the 
bedroom; and Ms. Graff and Mr. Matlock presented themselves as husband and 
wife.39  Based on these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that Ms. Graff was 
authorized to give consent and that the police officers conducted a reasonable 
and valid search.40 
The doctrine of third-party consent also applies to persons the police officer 
reasonably believes share common authority over the property but in fact do not.  
For example, in Illinois v. Rodriguez the Supreme Court considered a search of a 
house during which evidence of drug possession was sought and later used 
against Edward Rodriguez.41  The search was triggered by a domestic violence 
complaint made by Ms. Fischer to the police.42  She agreed to let the police into 
the house where Mr. Rodriguez was asleep.43  The Supreme Court held that Ms. 
Fischer’s consent was invalid since she did not have common authority over Mr. 
 
 34.  But see Elizabeth A. Wright, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Refusal, 
Consent, and Reasonableness, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1841, 1857 (2005) (stating that common authority 
rather than assumption of risk is the rational for third-party consent to search, though the author 
admits the two rationales are related). 
 35.  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, at 166-67. 
 36.  Id. at 136. 
 37.  Id. at 138. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 176. 
 40.  Id. at 177. 
 41.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 180 (1990).  See Tammy Campbell, Illinois v. Rodriguez: 
Should Apparent Authority Validate Third-Party Consent Searches?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 481 (1992); 
Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans 
Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 
TENN. L. REV. 1 (Fall 1991); Michael C. Wieber, The Theory and Practice of Illinois v. Rodriguez: Why an 
Officer’s Reasonable Belief About a Third Party’s Authority to Consent Does Not Protect a Criminal Suspect’s 
Rights, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604 (1993). 
 42.  Id. at 179. 
 43.  Id. 
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Rodriguez’s apartment.44  Though she used to live with Mr. Rodriguez, she 
moved out of the apartment with her children, taking her clothes and the 
children’s clothes with her (but leaving some furniture).45  At the time of the 
search she lived with her mother and only spent some nights with Mr. Rodriguez 
at his apartment.46  Her name was not on the lease nor did she contribute to the 
rent.47  She did have a key to the apartment, but she had taken it without Mr. 
Rodriguez’s knowledge.48  Based on these facts, the Supreme Court concluded 
that she was not authorized to consent to the search of Mr. Rodriguez’s 
apartment.49  However, if the police reasonably believed that Ms. Fischer had 
authority to consent to the search, then the search would have been valid even if 
the police’s belief turned out to be incorrect.50 
In Randolph, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a shared 
dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present 
resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given 
to the police by another resident.51  The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Souter, applied a social expectations standard. According to this standard, no 
one will enter a home when one tenant welcomes him and the other resists his 
entry to the house.  Thus, a police search in such circumstances is unreasonable.52  
Each occupant has authority to let the police into the house.53  However, in a case 
of disagreement between the occupants, the consenting occupant has no 
authority to prevail over the other present and objecting occupant.54  Thus, the 
disputed invitation makes the search unreasonable, similar to a case of a search 
absent consent at all.55  The Supreme Court distinguished this case from previous 
cases based on the fact that in Randolph the suspect was physically present, while 
 
 44.  Id. at 181–82. 
 45.  Id. at 181. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 181–82. 
 50.  Id. at 183. 
 51.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122–23 (2006).  For the facts of Randolph, see supra notes 
2–8 and accompanying text. 
 52.  For a psychological study of societal expectations of privacy in the home in a case of 
disputed permission to enter among the residents, see Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Ralph B. Taylor & Alan 
T. Harland, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and Third-Party Consent Searches, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121 
(1991).  For a general critique of the reasonable expectations test, see Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You 
Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253 (2006); William C. Heffernan, Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008); David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and 
Seizures, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1051 (2004); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward an 
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645 (1985).  For a 
suggestion of incorporating a least intrusive alternative component into the reasonableness test, see 
Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales through the Least 
Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988). 
 53.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109. 
 54.  Id. at 114. 
 55.  Id. 
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in Matlock and Rodriguez he was absent.56  The dissent, written by Chief Justice 
Roberts, critiqued this distinction as arbitrary.57  Based on Matlock and Rodriguez, 
the dissent argued that Ms. Randolph had authority to consent to the search of 
the house since she and the suspect lived in it together and Mr. Randolph thus 
assumed the risk she would let in the police.58  Thus, according to the dissenting 
opinion, the search would be valid based on Ms. Randolph’s consent, Mr. 
Randolph’s objection notwithstanding.59 
Third-party consent to search doctrine has been heavily critiqued,60 as was 
the consent to search exception.61  Scholars have argued that the doctrine goes 
against reasonable expectations of privacy.62  Based on their notion of reasonable 
expectations of privacy, scholars doubt whether third-party consent is truly 
voluntary due to police authority.63  Other scholars have argued that this 
doctrine gives police too much power to harass individuals in bad faith and 
pressure them to consent.64  Consequently, some scholars have suggested 
limiting the scope of this doctrine.65  Others have suggested abolishing it 
altogether.66 
After this brief layout of Fourth Amendment law as it relates to third-party 
consent to search, this Article turns to examine this doctrine by viewing it as a 
triangular relationship in which the dynamics between three people intersect 
with one another.  The three Parts that follow examine the relational dynamics 
between each edge of the triangle described. 
The importance of these relations are inspired by feminist literature, mainly 
cultural feminism.67  The relational view of people as connected to one another, 
and the understanding that people are influencing each other and at the same 
time are influenced by one another, is relevant to all cases of consensual search.  
 
 56.  Id. at 121. 
 57.  Id. at 137 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 58.  Id. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  For a review of the critique, see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 561 (2009). 
 61.  Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. 1229 (1983); Ross, supra note 20, at 5. 
 62.  See Kerr, supra note 60, at 590. 
 63.  See id. 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  Virginia Lee Cook, Third-Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 
121 (1973); Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086 (2006); George C. Thomas III, The Short, Unhappy Life of 
Consent Searches in New Jersey, 36 RUTGERS L. REC. 1 (Fall 2009); Michael J. Ticcioni, United States v. 
Andrus: Does the Apparent Authority Doctrine Allow Circumvention of Fourth Amendment Protection in the 
Warrantless Search of a Password-Protected Computer?, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 339 (Winter 2009); Elizabeth 
A. Wright, Third Party Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Refusal, Consent, and Reasonableness, 
62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1841 (Fall 2005). 
 66. See Brown, supra note 22, at 473.  See also Matthews, supra note 22. 
 67.  See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological 
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81 (1987). 
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Think for example of the Randolph decision:68 suppose Ms. Randolph had given 
her consent to search the house and evidence of her drug use (rather than Mr. 
Randolph’s) had been found and used against her.  Though this would not be a 
third-party consent to search case because the defendant would have given her 
own consent to the search, no doubt Mr. Randolph would have been affected as 
her spouse.  However, in third-party consent to search cases, the relational 
dynamics between the three participants is more acute.  In these cases the 
relations and tensions between the three actors are inherent.  Based on the 
consent of one occupant to police search, evidence found is used against the 
other occupant.  Though the relational theme applies to consensual searches in 
general, it is of utmost importance in cases of third-party consent to search.  Yet, 
this dimension has not been addressed in the Fourth Amendment literature 
concerning third-party consent to search.  This Article now turns to filling this 
gap. 
III. THE DYNAMIC BETWEEN THE CO-OCCUPANTS 
This Part explores the dynamics between the co-occupants.  Of course, this 
relationship is unique to the case of third-party consent to search and is absent 
from other cases of consensual searches.  In Georgia v. Randolph, Ms. Randolph 
consented to the search after Mr. Randolph objected to it.69  Mr. Randolph, the 
objecting occupant and eventual defendant, was physically present and opposed 
the search.70  By contrast, in other cases the defendant was not present in the 
home or was otherwise not aware of the search when the search took place.  In 
United States v. Matlock, Ms. Graff allowed the police to search the house after Mr. 
Matlock was arrested and put in a squad car outside the house.71  In Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, the police obtained Ms. Fischer’s consent to search while Mr. 
Rodriguez was asleep in the other room.72  All these cases involved cohabitating 
couples and married couples.  In each of these cases, the relationship between the 
two occupants is important to understanding whether valid consent was given. 
Examining the relation between the co-occupants using textual analysis and 
feminist literature on consent, this Part makes two interrelated claims.  First, in 
its analysis the Supreme Court’s rhetoric is gender neutral.  The Supreme Court 
assumes equality between the two occupants and disregards the power 
dynamics between opposite-sex couples.  Second, the Supreme Court constructs 
consent as an individualized process, unaffected by and divorced from its 
context.  The Court analyzes consent with no regard to the circumstances in 
which it was given or to the social settings, background, or consequences of the 
consent.  Most importantly, the opinion of the non-consenting occupant does not 
affect the consenting occupant and is considered irrelevant to the assessment of 
the consent’s validity. 
 
 68.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
 69.  Id. at 107. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974). 
 72.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179–80 (1990). 
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A.  Gender Neutral Analysis of Consent 
Fourth Amendment law, as stated by the Supreme Court, is gender neutral 
in that either occupant (man as well as woman) can withhold consent to search.73  
The Supreme Court assumes equality between the occupants: neither occupant 
can consent to a search under the protest of the physically present other.  The 
Randolph holding is neutral in that it does not favor the man over the woman or 
vice versa.74 
The Randolph dissent is also gender neutral, stating that the police may 
search based on the occupant’s consent over the objection of the other physically 
present occupant.75  While the majority ruled in favor of the objecting occupant 
(because his objection made the warrantless search illegal), the dissent preferred 
the consenting occupant (because her consent made the warrantless search 
legal).76  Though all the opinions differentiate between the consenting occupant 
and the objecting occupant, they do not differentiate between the husband and 
the wife.77As Justice Scalia explains in his dissenting opinion: 
The issue at hand is what to do when there is a conflict between two equals. Now 
that women have authority to consent, as Justice Stevens claims men alone once 
did, it does not follow that the spouse who refuses consent should be the winner 
of the contest. Justice Stevens could just as well have followed the same historical 
developments to the opposite conclusion: Now that ”the male and the female are 
equal partners,” and women can consent to a search of their property, men can 
no longer obstruct their wishes. Men and women are no more “equal” in the 
majority’s regime, where both sexes can veto each other’s consent, than on the 
dissent’s view, where both sexes cannot.78 
Furthermore, Justice Souter, delivering the opinion of the Court, 
emphasized that Fourth Amendment rights are not limited by the law of 
property but are instead based on a broader common authority rule.79  Thus, not 
only can the man give consent as an owner of the house, but each spouse who 
generally uses the house and has joint access or control of the house may consent 
because they share common authority.  As Justice Stevens notes: 
In the 18th century, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the advice 
 
 73.  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 114. 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  See id. at 128. 
 76.  No opinion suggests a rule according to which the first occupant to be approached by police 
will prevail.  Here the sergeant first asked Mr. Randolph’s permission to search the home (and he 
refused), and then he asked Ms. Randolph for her permission (which she readily gave).  Also, no 
opinion suggests a rule according to which the police need to attain the consent of all occupants to a 
warrantless search. 
 77.  While Justice Souter’s opinion differentiates between a situation where the objecting 
occupant is physically present (and his refusal trumps the consent of the other occupant) and a 
situation where the objecting occupant is absent (and the consent of the occupant physically present 
prevails over his objection), the dissent treats both situations the same (since in both cases the 
warrantless search is legal upon the occupant’s consent).  See generally Randolph, 547 U.S. 103. 
 78.  Id. at 144 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 79.  Id. at 110. 
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would have been quite different from what is appropriate today.  Given the then-
prevailing dramatic differences between the property rights of the husband and 
the far lesser rights of the wife, only the consent of the husband would matter.  
Whether “the master of the house” consented or objected, his decision would 
control.  Thus if “original understanding” were to govern the outcome of this 
case, the search was clearly invalid because the husband did not consent.  
History, however, is not dispositive because it is now clear, as a matter of 
constitutional law, that the male and the female are equal partners.80 
Justice Souter also emphasized the equality between the co-occupants, saying: 
“There is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or 
authority to prevail over the express wishes of another, whether the issue is the 
color of the curtains or invitations to outsiders.”81  Further, 
[W]hen people living together disagree over the use of their common quarters, a 
resolution must come through voluntary accommodation, not by appeals to 
authority. Unless the people living together fall within some recognized 
hierarchy, like a household of parent and child or barracks housing military 
personnel of different grades, there is no societal understanding of superior and 
inferior.82 
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent acknowledges that “[t]he 
majority’s assumption about voluntary accommodation simply leads to the 
common stalemate of two gentlemen insisting that the other enter a room first.”83 
Justice Scalia criticized the majority’s rule for not treating men and women 
equally and for giving power to men over women.84  However, his critique is 
only relevant to extreme cases of domestic violence, and he does not refer to 
other situations: 
[I] must express grave doubt that today’s decision deserves Justice Stevens’ 
celebration as part of the forward march of women’s equality.  Given the usual 
patterns of domestic violence, how often can police be expected to encounter the 
situation in which a man urges them to enter the home while a woman 
simultaneously demands that they stay out?  The most common practical effect 
of today’s decision, insofar as the contest between the sexes is concerned, is to 
give men the power to stop women from allowing police into their homes—
which is, curiously enough, precisely the power that Justice Stevens 
disapprovingly presumes men had in 1791.85 
In cases where the consenting third-party was a landlord86 or hotel 
manager,87 the common authority rule does not apply and they cannot admit a 
 
 80.  Id. at 124–25 (Stevens, J., concurring).  But see Justice Scalia’s dissent where he questions this 
historical description.  Id. at 143 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 81.  Id. at 114. 
 82.  Id. at 113–4. 
 83.  Id. at 129 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 84.  Id. at 145 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). 
 87.  Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
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person without the consent of the current tenant.88  Similarly, an overnight guest 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his host’s home.89  Last, in cases of 
hierarchy, as between parent and child90 or in the army,91 the common authority 
rule is not applicable.92  But in all other cases of shared occupancy, the Supreme 
Court’s rule will apply no matter what the relationship between the two 
occupants.  Thus, the Supreme Court does not distinguish between spouses, 
roommates, cousins, or any other co-tenants. 
The legal question in Randolph is termed in gender-neutral language: does 
the consent of one occupant trump the objection of the other occupant or vice 
versa?93  In a case of disagreement between two co-habitants over whether to let 
the police in, which occupant should prevail?94  Phrasing the question this way 
ignores the fact that in Randolph, as in other third-party consent Supreme Court 
cases, the objecting occupant is a man and the consenting occupant is a woman. 
According to the Supreme Court, either spouse can give consent.95  Men and 
women are equal and thus either has the authority to consent to a search.  But is 
the gender of the two occupants truly irrelevant?  In Randolph, as in other third-
party consent cases, the woman rather than the man consented to the search.96  
Despite this consistency, the Supreme Court does not take this fact into account.97  
Randolph is a typical case where an accused man is challenging the admission of 
evidence secured by the police after getting the consent of his wife or girlfriend.98  
Sergeant Murray asked Ms. Randolph’s permission to search the house after Mr. 
Randolph refused to give such permission.99  In Matlock, Ms. Graff agreed to the 
police house search after Mr. Matlock was arrested and put in a squad car 
outside the house.100  Similarly, in Rodriguez the police obtained Ms. Fischer’s 
consent to search when Mr. Rodriguez was asleep.101  However, in all these cases, 
the gender of the consenting party is not considered.  Though Chief Justice 
Roberts’ dissent in Randolph criticized the majority’s rule for being arbitrary, it 
 
 88.  See Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490; Chapman, 365 U.S. at 616–17. 
 89.  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).  See also 
Gregory J. Wartman, Is This Reasonable?: The Supreme Court’s Inconsistent Treatment of House Guests, 62 
U. PITT. L. REV. 387 (2000); Joseph Williams, Minnesota v. Carter: The Fourth Amendment Implications of 
Inviting Guests into the Home, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 797 (2001). 
 90.  See Matt McCaughey, And a Child Shall Lead Them: The Validity of Children’s Consent to 
Warrantless Searches of the Family Home, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 747 (1995).  See also Jason C. Miller, 
When Is a Parent’s Authority Apparent? Reconsidering Third-Party Consent Searches of an Adult Child’s 
Private Bedroom and Property, 24 CRIM. JUST. 34 (2010). 
 91.  Justin Holbrook, Communications Privacy in the Military, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 831 (2010). 
 92.  See McCaughey, supra note 90; Miller, supra note 90; Holbrook, supra note 91. 
 93.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106, 108 (2006). 
 94.  See, e.g., id. 
 95.  See id. at 114. 
 96.  Id. at 107. 
 97.  See id. at 114. 
 98.  See id. at 107. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 166 (1974). 
 101.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990). 
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did not raise its gendered implications.102  Treating the gender of the consenter as 
relevant raises the question of whether the police target the women and not the 
men for a reason.  Perhaps the police intentionally approach the woman rather 
than the man because they suspected they had a better chance of getting her 
agreement; perhaps the police approach the woman specifically when her 
husband was away because they thought she would probably let them in while 
the man would probably not.  Will the Supreme Court’s ruling lead to more of 
this sexist behavior?  The Supreme Court did not reflect on these questions, and 
its gender-neutral analysis ignores the power inequities of the co-occupants. 
According to the Supreme Court, consent needs to be voluntary;103 however, 
the Court’s analysis assumes that social constraints due to patriarchy and racism 
are irrelevant.  Nonetheless, scholars have argued that race and gender affect 
consent.  The Randolph decision addressed the issue of battered women where 
gender clearly impacts cases in which violent men do not let the police into the 
house to aid their domestic violence victim wives and girlfriends.  Gender has a 
broader reach, though.104  Feminist scholars argue that the power dynamic 
between the police officer and the consenting individual is always gendered.105 
However, the Supreme Court and feminist literature address only the relations 
between the police officer and the consenting occupant106 and neglect the 
dynamic between the co-occupants.  The co-tenants might have conflicting 
interests or they might cooperate with one another to withhold information or 
evidence from the police.  For example, in Randolph  Mr. and Ms. Randolph had a 
domestic dispute that led Ms. Randolph to call the police.107  She had an interest 
in having Mr. Randolph arrested for using drugs.108  In Rodriguez, Ms. Fischer 
also wanted the police to arrest Mr. Rodriguez, who had severely beaten her.109  
On the other hand, in Matlock, Ms. Graff’s cooperation with the police probably 
resulted from her belief that such cooperation would be in Mr. Matlock’s best 
interest.110  A person might also cooperate with the police to suggest that she is 
innocent and not involved in the other occupant’s illegal activities; she might 
wish to distance herself from the incriminating evidence belonging to the other 
occupant.  A person might wish to help the police fight crime, even to the 
detriment of her co-occupant.  Additionally, a third-party might yield to police 
authority or choose to cooperate even if cooperation means betraying a co-
occupant and delivering evidence that incriminates the co-occupant.  Conversely, 
 
 102.  See Randolph, 547 U.S at 127–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 103.  See, e.g., Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973); Dana 
Raigrodski, Consent Engendered: A Feminist Critique of Consensual Fourth Amendment Searches, 16 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 37 (2004). 
 104.  Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 61. 
 105. See Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth 
Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 153 (2008); Ross, supra note 20. 
 106.  See, e.g., Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103; Raigrodski, Reasonableness and 
Objectivity, supra note 105; Ross, supra note 20. 
 107.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 117 (1990). 
 110.  See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
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the third-party may be committed to her co-occupant and refuse to cooperate 
with the police even to her own detriment.  In some cases, the level of loyalty 
between two roommates might be lower than in the case of a married couple; in 
other cases, good friends or family members might have a stronger connection 
than an estranged couple.  Even though the co-occupants’ relations affect the 
decision to give or withhold consent, this edge of the triangle is missing from 
Fourth Amendment analysis. 
The only specific situation discussed in Randolph is that of a battered wife 
who seeks the police’s help but whose abusive husband does not consent to 
police entrance in the home.111  According to the dissent, application of Justice 
Souter’s rule in this situation would result in the police’s inability to enter the 
house and help the victim of spousal abuse.112  The majority responded that, in 
such circumstances, the police officer is allowed to go into the house to protect 
the victim of domestic violence on exigent circumstances grounds (as opposed to 
consent to search grounds).113  Thus, both the majority and the dissent appear 
sensitive to the context of domestic violence.  However, the majority applies its 
general rule (consent of the occupant cannot legally justify the warrantless search 
over the objection of the other occupant) and the dissent applies its general rule 
(consent of the occupant trumps the objection of the other occupant) to cases of 
domestic violence rather than applying a contextualized rule sensitive to 
different situations.114 
Additionally, both the majority and the dissent focus only on the extreme 
case of domestic violence.  In Randolph, Ms. Randolph called the police because of 
a domestic dispute with Mr. Randolph.115  The opinion does not disclose whether 
Ms. Randolph suffered any physical abuse.  The Supreme Court states that she 
returned to the marital home after spending several weeks with their child at her 
parents’ house in Canada.116  She complained that her husband was a cocaine 
user and that he took their child to the neighbor’s house.117  Based on the facts 
stated in the decision, she did not claim that Mr. Randolph was violent.  In fact, it 
is unclear whether she returned to reconcile with Mr. Randolph.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis regarding battered women is irrelevant to both the 
Randolphs’ relations and to the relations of many other couples.  However, 
 
 111.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 117–18, 139–45.  See Andrea Ferro, Georgia v. Randolph: Warrantless 
Search and Seizure and Its Impact on Domestic Violence, 15 Dig. 77 (2007); Amanda Jane Proctor, Breaking 
into the Marital Home to Break up Domestic Violence: Fourth Amendment Analysis of “Disputed Permission,” 
17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 139 (2009); Meagan Rasch-Chabot, The Home As Their Castle: An 
Analysis of Georgia v. Randolph’s Implications for Domestic Disputes, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 507 (2007) 
(discussing search of dwellings in cases of domestic violence). 
 112.  Randolph, 547 U.S.at 139 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 113.  Id. at 117. 
 114.  For an analysis of this case as it is applied to the home of battered women, see JEANNIE SUK, 
AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE  REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 106 
(2009); Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L. J. 485 (2009); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Exigency, 49 
ARIZ. L. REV. 801 (2007). 
 115.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
 116.  Id. at 106–07. 
 117.  Id. at 107. 
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gender is an important aspect of consent in all third-party consent cases and not 
only in extreme cases of battered women. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the relations between the two co-occupants 
is limited to domestic violence cases.  However, the power dynamic between co-
tenants is a relevant consideration in all third-party consent to search cases.118 
The impact of the co-tenants’ relations on consent is not limited to extreme cases 
of domestic violence.  This relation provides an important background to truly 
understand all cases of third-party consent and to assess the consent’s validity.  
The Court should be sensitive to the relationship between the co-tenants at all 
times, and not only in extreme situations of domestic violence.  Consideration of 
this factor is warranted for policy consideration reasons (i.e., enabling the police 
to protect battered women) and as part of the examination of the context under 
which consent was given.  Understanding the relations between co-tenants is 
essential to address the question of the consent’s validity. 
Consent to the search affects the other co-occupants not only in third-party 
consent to search cases but in all consensual search cases.  However, in third-
party consent to search cases, the impact on the non-consenting co-occupant is 
even more severe because the consent of one occupant is used against the other 
occupant.  In their critique of the Court’s gender neutral analysis of consent, 
feminists only point to the gender power dynamics between the consenting 
individual and the police officer, neglecting the gender power dynamics between 
the two occupants.119  Gendered relations should be addressed especially in cases 
of married or cohabitating couples.  In these cases, the gender dynamic is more 
acute than in cases of roommates.  By assuming equality between the two 
occupants, the Supreme Court neglects the importance of these relations. 
By proposing consideration of the gender dynamics between the two co-
occupants, this Article does not mean to suggest a paternalistic intervention in 
their relations by the police or by the court to the aid of women.  This Article 
suggests more narrowly that the police and the court should take this dynamic 
into account when determining the validity of consent given.  Additionally, in 
Randolph as in other cases, the cohabitants were a man and a woman.  However, 
the dynamics between the two co-occupants are relevant also in cases of same-
sex couples or in cases where family members, relatives, friends, or colleagues 
share a home.  As in cases of couples, the relations between these co-habitants is 
a factor to be considered when assessing consent.  Thus, the Court must engage 
in a nuanced analysis of the relations between co-occupants in order to fully 
evaluate unilateral consent given by one of the occupants. 
 
 118.  For the dynamics between the consenting party and the suspect, see Dorothy K. Kagehiro & 
Ralph B. Taylor, Third-Party Consent Searches: Legal vs. Social Perceptions of “Common Authority,” 18 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1274 (1988); Dorothy K. Kagehiro, William S. Laufer & Ralph B. Taylor, Social 
Perceptions of Third-Party Consent and the Reasonableness Test of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 29 J. RES. CRIM. & 
DELINQ. 217 (1992); Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Ralph B. Taylor, William S. Laufer & Alan T. Harland, 
Hindsight Bias and Third-Party Consentors to Warrantless Police Searches, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1991). 
 119.  See Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103. 
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B.  Consent as an Individualized Process 
The Supreme Court rhetoric constructs consent as an individualized 
process, meaning consent is a personal decision unaffected by social 
circumstances.  By disregarding the gender, race, and class of the consenter and 
the other occupant’s lack of consent, the Supreme Court divorces the consent 
from its context.  The Supreme Court’s analysis of consent is also a-contextual in 
the sense that it disregards other factors, including the circumstances in which 
consent is given, the person to whom consent is given (the police, the spouse, a 
visitor), and the purpose for which consent is given (to a police search, to let the 
police in, to let a visitor in, to buy curtains).  The Supreme Court views consent 
as a personal process unaffected by these circumstances;120 consent is isolated 
from its surroundings, with no background and no impact on others.121 
As previously discussed, Supreme Court opinions assume that the 
relationship between the consenting occupant and the objecting occupant is 
irrelevant.  While the Court recognizes the importance of the power dynamic in 
the case of battered wives,122 the relationship influences cases beyond domestic 
violence.  For example, the Randolph decision is a-contextual, as it disregards the 
fact that unilateral consent to police entry was given in the context of a married 
couple sharing a home.123  Contrary to the Supreme Court, this Article claims 
that these factors do matter and relate to the voluntariness and validity of 
consent.  Ignoring the relationship’s influence divorces the analysis of consent 
from gender considerations and from its overall context. 
The Supreme Court’s use of assumption of risk rhetoric also leads to an 
individualistic notion of consent.  According to the Court, each occupant 
assumes the risk that the other occupant may invite the police into the shared 
home.124  Relying on prior Fourth Amendment cases, Chief Justice Roberts 
explains that: 
The common thread in our decisions upholding searches conducted pursuant to 
third-party consent is an understanding that a person “assume[s] the risk” that 
those who have access to and control over his shared property might consent to a 
search . . . [T]his assumption of risk is derived from a third party’s “joint access 
or control for most purposes” of shared property . . . [S]hared use of property 
makes it “reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to 
permit the inspection in his own right” . . . A person assumes the risk that his co-
occupants—just as they might report his illegal activity or deliver his contraband 
to the government—might consent to a search of areas over which they have 
access and control.125 
Other Supreme Court opinions rely on the same assumption of risk rationale.126  
 
 120.  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990); United States 
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). 
 121.  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185–86; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170. 
 122.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 117–18. 
 123.  Id. at 122–23. 
 124.  Id. at 134–36. 
 125. Id. at 134-36 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 126. See  Matlock, 415 U.S. 171 n. 7; Frazier v. United States, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969). 
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Even Justice Souter, who based his opinion on reasonable expectations, cites 
previous cases acknowledging the risk assumption rationale.127 
This economic assumption of risk rhetoric describes two occupants 
calculating risks rather than a married couple living together in a sharing, 
trusting relationship.128  Furthermore, this rhetoric indicates an individualistic 
mode of decision making that views the other occupant’s impact as a hazard 
rather than as a mutual decision making mechanism through which both 
occupants come to a joint decision.  Accordingly, each occupant needs to be 
aware of how the other occupant’s actions in the shared home could negatively 
affect him and each occupant must guard his own interests.  The Supreme Court 
thus makes sharing unsafe in that it inherently entails the risk of waiving your 
privacy. 
According to the Supreme Court, each party has the authority to consent to 
a police search and mutual consent is not necessary.129  Under such a rule, the 
police should decide who prevails in a case of disputed consent, as there is no 
notion of joint decision of a married couple.  Each tenant makes his individual 
decision, and the court later determines whose decision trumps in a case of 
disagreement, as in Randolph.130  The Court only declares that both tenants have 
an equal right to consent and that no occupant has more power than the other, 
but it does not endorse a joint decision model for providing consent to search.131  
When the validity of the search is contested, a court would decide which 
occupant’s decision prevailed. 
Justice Souter rejects the alternative model of joint decision as atypical, 
unusual and particular: 
[S]hared tenancy is understood to include an “assumption of risk,” on which 
police officers are entitled to rely, and although some group living together 
might make an exceptional arrangement that no one could admit a guest without 
the agreement of all, the chance of such an eccentric scheme is too remote to 
expect visitors to investigate a particular household’s rules before accepting an 
invitation to come in.132 
Thus, the rule according to which each co-habitant may consent to search 
assumes that usually it is each co-tenant to himself, regardless of the other 
cotenants.  The Supreme Court rejects notions of trust, cooperation, 
connectedness, and mutuality in favor of individualism.  As Chief Justice Roberts 
explains in Randolph, one need not trust or share with his co-occupant, but rather 
 
 127.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110–111. 
 128.  For psychological studies that show that co-occupants do not assume the risk that the other 
co-occupant will allow a police search, see Dorothy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer, Illinois v. 
Rodriguez and the Social Psychology of Third-Party Consent, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 42, 43–44 (1991); Dorothy 
K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer, The Assumption of Risk Doctrine and Third-Party Consent Searches, 26 
CRIM. L. BULL. 195, 202, 207 (1990). 
 129.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185–86 (1990); Matlock, 415 U.S. 
at 170. 
 130.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 111–12. 
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“[t]o the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a 
consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an 
area over which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a 
locked suitcase under a bed.”133  Thus, the Court constructs consent as an 
individualistic process and rejects a joint model of consent. 
Of course, not all couples make joint decisions or live in harmony.  In 
situations where there is domestic violence, like in Rodriguez,134 or a dispute 
between the husband and wife, like in Randolph,135 little cooperation is expected.  
However, a joint decision model—an alternative to the Supreme Court’s model—
might be relevant in other situations.  A married couple especially might behave 
as a unit.  At a minimum, a wife might be influenced or affected by her co-
occupant’s preference.  Even if the couple’s relations are not harmonious, she 
might take his opinion into account when making her decision.  Contrary to the 
Supreme Court, this Article suggests that the co-tenant’s opinion is relevant.  
One tenant’s decision to permit the search is not divorced from her relations with 
the other tenant.  Rather, even in non-harmonious relations, her consent must be 
understood in the context of her relation with her husband and his refusal to let 
the police search the house. 
At first, the Court’s individualistic approach described above seems to 
empower women.  In cases of domestic violence, this approach enables women 
to seek police protection despite the batterer’s wishes.  In other cases, an 
individualistic approach grants the woman power equal to that of her spouse.  
As explained by the majority in Randolph, in cases of battered women, the police 
can help victims of spousal abuse not by using consent but rather, other grounds 
for search (such as exigent circumstances).136 However, this Article argues that an 
individualistic approach does not necessarily empower women.137  Women are 
relational: they value the relationships in their lives and see themselves as 
connected to others.138  Thus, the Court’s individualistic notion of consent might 
disturb a woman’s sense of connectedness and the importance of relations in her 
life.  In spite of the critique of the individualistic notion of consent, the Article 
does not call for an alternative joint notion of consent.  Rather, it posits a more 
modest and less radical claim: consent is influenced and affected by the other 
occupant’s opinion. 
Professor Coombs criticizes Fourth Amendment law for applying a narrow, 
individualistic conception of privacy rather than a shared notion of privacy.139  
 
 133.  Id. at 135 (Robert, C.J., dissenting). 
 134.  497 U.S. at 179. 
 135.  547 U.S. at 106. 
 136.  547 U.S. at 119. 
 137.  Compare this to the family law context, where scholars have criticized an individualistic 
view of family law that treats the family as individual family members rather than as a unit and 
protects autonomous selves rather than connected individuals in relations and social networks.  See 
Martha Minow, “Forming Underneath Everything that Grows:” Toward a History of Family Law, WIS. L. 
REV. 819, 894 (1985). 
 138.  West, supra note 67. 
 139.  Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 
CALIF. L. REV. 1593 (1987).  For another critique of the narrow view of privacy under Fourth 
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She argues that the law views persons as individualistic in their behaviors and 
expectations and ignores the way a search affects the defendant’s family, friends, 
colleagues and relationships.140  Instead, she advocates for a notion of shared 
privacy according to which searches paradigmatically involve an intrusion into 
an area that is subject to an ongoing personal relationship between the defendant 
and others.141  According to Coombs, privacy is the “protection of chosen 
intimacy rather than aloneness,”142 and the right to privacy belongs to groups 
rather than individuals.143  In place of a narrow individualistic analysis, she 
recommends a contextual analysis that captures the complexity of human 
relations.144  In her view, “third-party consent should be recognized where the 
consent is uncoerced, and where the consenter, by virtue of his relationship to 
the primary right holder, would otherwise have standing to challenge the 
search.”145  Thus, in third-party consent cases “where the intimacy of the 
relationship between the consenter and the defendant renders betrayal of the 
defendant’s interests unlikely, courts should take care to assure themselves that 
the consent was uncoerced.”146  The more intimate the relationship between the 
defendant and the consenter, the more suspicious the court should be that the 
consent was truly voluntary.147 
Though Professor Coombs focuses on privacy, her approach is relevant to 
consent as well.  The Supreme Court adopts not only an individualistic approach 
to privacy but also an individualistic concept of consent.  This individualistic 
notion of consent is especially problematic in third-party consent to search cases 
where two people share a home and one gives her consent to the police to the 
detriment and against the wishes of the other occupant (whether he is present 
and objecting or absent and presumably would have objected). 
IV.  THE DYNAMIC BETWEEN THE POLICE OFFICER AND THE 
CONSENTING OCCUPANT 
This Part explores the dynamic between the police officer and the 
consenting occupant.  Based on textual analysis and feminist literature on 
consent, this Part makes two interrelated claims.  First, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis is power-blind: the Court ignores the power dynamic between the state 
representative and the citizen, treating them as equals negotiating the terms of 
the search.  Second, the Supreme Court constructs consent as a legitimating 
factor; consent justifies the police actions and privileges the police over the 
citizen.  While these two claims are relevant to all consensual searches, their 
 
Amendment law, see also Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment after 
Lawrence, 57 UCLA  L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 140.  Coombs, supra, note 139, at 1594. 
 141.  Id. at 1596. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 1598. 
 145.  Id. at 1597. 
 146.  Id. at 1599–1600. 
 147.  Id. at 1661. 
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importance is more acute in third-party consent to search cases.  In third-party 
consent to search cases one occupant consents to police who hold official 
positions of power to the detriment of the other occupant (the defendant), which 
further complicates third-party consent to search cases. 
A.  Power Blind Analysis of Consent 
Like the relationship between two occupants, the Court views the 
relationship between the police and the individual in neutral terms with no 
regard to the power imbalance between them.  Under the Supreme Court’s 
analysis, consent to search resembles agreement to a contract with the police 
rather than acquiescence to state intrusion.  According to Justice Souter, 
disagreement over police entrance mirrors disagreement over admitting a guest 
or choosing the style of curtains: “there is no common understanding that one 
co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of 
another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to 
outsiders.”148  The Supreme Court misguidedly compares this mundane aesthetic 
decision to a decision to cooperate with state authority.149 
Moreover, the power blind analysis of consent is apparent in the Court’s 
rhetoric.  The Supreme Court uses the neutral term “caller”150 when it elucidates 
the rule regarding the police’s right to enter the house: 
[I]t is fair to say that a caller standing at the door of shared premises would have 
no confidence that one occupant’s invitation was a sufficiently good reason to 
enter when a fellow tenant stood there saying, “stay out.”  Without some very 
good reason, no sensible person would go inside under those conditions.  Fear 
for the safety of the occupant issuing the invitation, or of someone else inside, 
would be thought to justify entry, but the justification then would be the 
personal risk, the threats to life or limb, not the disputed invitation.151 
The choice of the word “caller” to describe a police officer disregards the power 
he holds over the individual as a state official.  As Chief Justice Roberts points 
out in his dissent, an officer is not just a “visitor” but a state’s representative: 
Mrs. Randolph did not invite the police to join her for dessert and coffee; the 
officer’s precise purpose in knocking on the door was to assist with a dispute 
between the Randolphs—one in which Mrs. Randolph felt the need for the 
protective presence of the police.152 
Though Chief Justice Roberts acknowledges that the situation in Randolph is 
not one of a social visit but rather of state intervention, he stops short of 
acknowledging the inherent hierarchy between the officer and the Randolphs.  
Feminists like Professor Raigrodski have demonstrated that there is inequality of 
power between the police and the individual.  They have critiqued Fourth 
 
 148.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114 (2006). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  The Court also uses the words “outsider” and “guest.” See id. at 113, 114. 
 151. Id. at 113. 
 152.  Id. at 139 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Amendment law for ignoring this power dynamic and maintaining the power 
imbalance:153 
The Court’s construction of consent and coercion disregards the inherently 
coercive nature of all police-initiated encounters that undermine the notion of a 
meaningful consent.  Moreover, the dichotomy of consent-coercion perpetuates 
patriarchal power structures that privilege, among other things, the police in its 
encounter with the individual.  This dichotomy reflects a male perspective and is 
itself an artificial construct of patriarchal ideology . . . [T]he Court’s consent-to-
search cases are driven by this patriarchal ideology to maintain social structures 
of power disparities and to perpetuate the subordination of women, minorities, 
and other disempowered members of society.154 
Contrary to the Court’s neutral analysis, Professor Raigrodski highlights the 
power imbalance inherent in police searches.  Similarly, Professor Ross critiques 
Fourth Amendment law for disregarding power disparity between the suspect 
and the police.155  Building on the feminist critique of rape law, Professor Ross 
advocates recognition of more subtle forms of coercion that would result in a 
broader definition of coercion that negates consent.156  She points out that 
structural power imbalances between the suspect and the police affect a person’s 
choice to assent or resist.157  Thus, submission should not be equated with 
consent. 
Professor Ross proposes a focus on the point of view of the consenter rather 
than on the reasonableness of the police action.  To do so, she believes consent 
must be viewed in the context of social constraints and inequalities.158  Ross 
prefers a subjective test of consent over an objective test.159  Accordingly, the 
courts should examine the will of the consenting suspect instead of how much 
force was used by police.160  This focus on the consenter’s perspective will 
demonstrate concern with the consenter’s experience.  Ross is careful to note 
that, while focusing on the consenter, courts should not blame suspects for 
allowing access to the police based on the assumption that the suspect chose to 
consent to the search.161  She emphasizes that lack of resistance does not equate 
to allowance of a search.162  Ross argues that disregarding the power imbalance 
between the police officer and the citizen gives the former more power.163  She 
 
 153. See Robert V. Ward Jr., Consensual Searches, The Fairytale that Became a Nightmare: Fargo Lessons 
Concerning Police Initiated Encounters, 15 TOURO L. REV. 451 (1999); Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a 
Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a “Reasonable Person,” 36 HOW. L.J. 
239 (1993). 
 154.  Raidgrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 38–39. 
 155.  Ross, supra note 20. 
 156.  Id. at 1. 
 157.  Id. at 47 (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983)). 
 158.  Id. at 43, 49 (citing MacKinnon, supra note 157). 
 159.  Id. at 29–30. 
 160.  Id. at 43 (citing Mackinnon, supra note 157). 
 161.  Id. at 55–56. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 67. 
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shows how power blind analysis of consent results in perpetuating existing 
power disparities and suggests that autonomy and privacy should be the core 
goals of the consent doctrine.164  Ross shows how power blind analysis 
essentially renders the consent fallacious.  On the other hand, taking into account 
the power imbalance would strengthen the autonomy and privacy of the 
consenting suspect. 
The alternative feminist analysis of consent interprets Fourth Amendment 
law through ideas of anti-subordination and empowerment: 
[T]he Court must identify the power matrix between the parties, considering 
such factors as the gender, race, and class of both the officer and the individual, 
and any other factors which may contribute to an imbalance of power in the 
specific case at hand, such as general police practices or general attitudes about 
crime and security.  The court must then determine whether such power 
disparities were exploited in an impermissible way . . . Power imbalances are 
often invisible and appear natural . . . This is exactly why we impose a moral 
obligation on the powerful to act from the perspective of those less powerful.165 
The feminist alternative advocated by Raigrodski empowers the consenter 
rather than maintaining existing power disparities.166  Contrary to the Court’s 
power blind analysis, the feminist alternative seeks to mitigate the power 
imbalance between the police and individual.  Additionally, the feminist notion 
of consent is set from the perspective of the suspect.  Rather than assessing 
whether the police used too much coercive force, the court should examine the 
subjective will of the suspect. Feminists suggest that courts examine consent 
from the consenter’s point of view rather than inspecting the police actions. 
[I]n evaluating the consensual nature of the search and of the encounter between 
the police and the individual we should primarily focus on the actual state of 
mind of the individual.  We should attempt to evaluate his or her agency and 
choices within the complex arena of fractured structural forces and pressures, 
especially historic indicators of multiple social oppressions.  This would require 
asking different sets of questions.  We should ask, for example, did the 
individual act with a consciousness of his or her social position?  What is the 
range of experience that informed her ability to imagine alternative choices?  
How did he feel when he “consented”?167 
According to Raigrodski, the court analysis of consent should not be limited to 
questioning whether police have used excessive and coercive power to attain 
consent.168  Rather, the court analysis of consent should center on the suspect and 
 
 164.  Id. at 64.  But see Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”‘s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994) (suggesting that one of the principles 
of the Fourth Amendment law is reciprocal government-citizen trust). 
 165.  Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 61.  For similar feminist analysis of 
consent paying attention to power imbalance, see Raigrodski, Reasonableness and Objectivity, supra 
note 105; Ross, supra note 20. 
 166.  See generally Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 105, at 61; Raigrodski, Reasonableness 
and Objectivity, supra note 105; Ross, supra note 20. 
 167.  Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 61. 
 168.  Id. 
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question whether she truly consented to the search as opposed to submitting to 
the police.169 
The Supreme Court’s analysis is not only power blind but also gender- and 
race-blind.  The Court assumes that neither plays a role in the power dynamics 
between the police officer and the consenting individual and that the consent is 
unaffected by race or gender.  Conversely, scholars discussing power imbalance 
have highlighted the way that race affects whether an individual adheres to 
police authority.  Research shows that people, especially racial minorities, tend to 
submit to police power, and that the police are sometimes motivated by racial 
stereotypes.170  As a result, scholars criticize Fourth Amendment law for being 
insensitive to and unconcerned with the reality of race.171 
For example, Professor Carbado claims that courts ignore race and engage 
in a colorblind or race neutral analysis.172  He criticizes courts’ assumption that 
individuals’ interactions with the police are neither affected by nor mediated 
through race.173  Similarly, he criticizes the courts’ assumption that race plays no 
part in whether and how the police engage certain people.174  Accordingly, race 
only matters if a particular police officer exhibits overtly racist behavior.175  
Otherwise, police action is presumed to be constitutional.176  As a result, 
Professor Carbado argues that “people of color are burdened more by, and 
benefit less from, the Fourth Amendment than whites.”177  He suggests a 
consenter perspective that is race-conscious.178  This approach does not focus on 
racist police officers but on the “ways in which race structures the interaction 
between police officers and nonwhite persons.”179 
Consent to search under the Fourth Amendment has not only racial 
implications but also gender implications.180  Feminists like Professor Raigrodski 
 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory into 
the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215; Dorothy K. Kagehiro, 
Psycholegal Research on the Fourth Amendment, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 187 (1990). 
 171.  David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity as a Factor in Assessing the Reasonableness of Fourth 
Amendment Activity: Description, Yes; Prediction, No, 73 MISS. L. J. 423 (2003); Christo Lassiter, 
Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79 (1998); Tracey 
Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: 
Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243 (1991); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998); Robin K. Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth 
Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 
151 (1994); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent 
Searches, 73 MISS. L. J. 525 (2003). 
 172.   Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. at 968–69. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 969. 
 178.  Id. at 970. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Fourth Amendment law also has class implications.  See Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth 
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call for an analysis of consent that acknowledges the dynamics of power between 
police and citizens on the basis of race and sex: 
Encounters between the police and the individual cannot be characterized as 
equal in power under our current social hierarchical structures.  Rather they 
reflect the invisible subordination of the individual to the power of the 
patriarchal state and law.  In most cases, the individual would in fact be 
powerless to resist these forces and would quietly submit by consenting to the 
search, absent meaningful choices from his or her subordinated position.  Every 
time the Court insists on characterizing this submission as a true act of agency 
and free-willed choice, oblivious to power disparities and social constraints, it 
reifies the individual’s subordinated state.  This is especially true for women and 
minorities whose subordination to the police is but one manifestation of their all-
encompassing social subordination.181 
Thus, Professor Raigrodski argues that the notion of consent is male-biased and 
“maintains social structures of domination and power disparities and 
perpetuates the subordination of women, minorities, and other disempowered 
members of society.”182 
Professor Raigrodski applies the feminist critique of the consent/coercion 
dichotomy to Fourth Amendment law.183  She claims that the Court distinguishes 
between consensual searches and exceptional instances of the use of force or 
threats by the police.184  By creating this hierarchy, only rare and extreme 
instances of police abuse of power render a search invalid.185  Searches in which 
the police did not use such force are deemed consensual and thus legitimate, 
valid, and constitutional.186  Though she discussed generally consent to search, 
Professor Raigrodski’s critique is relevant to third-party consent to search cases 
as well.  In cases of third-party consent to search, gender and race also play an 
important role in understanding consent. Furthermore, in this context the power 
analysis works in three dimensions (each of the three edges of the triangle) and 
should not be limited only to the police-consenting individual dimension.  
Rather, the race and gender dynamic are present in relations between the police 
and the co-tenants. 
Examining the race and gender effects on consent is complicated.  In 
 
Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355 
(2010); Alfredo Mirande, Is There a “Mexican Exception” to the Fourth Amendment?, FLA. L. REV. 365 
(2003) (discussing Mexicans and other non-resident aliens); Victor C. Romero, The Domestic Fourth 
Amendment Rights of Undocumented Immigrants: On Guitterez and the Tort Law/Immigration Law Parallel, 
35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (2000) (discussing undocumented immigrants); Christopher Slobogin, 
The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391 (2003); William J. Stuntz, Privacy in 
the Criminal Context: Panel IV The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1265 (1999). 
 181.  Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 58. 
 182.  Id. at 37–38. 
 183.  For another critique of this dichotomy, see  Simmons, supra note 28.  But see Daniel R. 
Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look at Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L. J. 69 (2007). 
 184.  Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 49–50. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
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Randolph, the police officer was a man and the consenting individual a woman.187  
However, the power dynamics remain relevant in the opposite case where the 
police officer is a woman and the consenting individual is a man.  Power 
dynamics are also apparent when a male police officer encounters a male 
civilian.188  Additionally, the power dynamics analysis is applicable in situations 
of upper-class individuals, as the case of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates 
demonstrates.189  As these examples show, gender, race, and class may intersect 
in different ways.  The relation between the police officer and the consenting 
individual is complex, involving race, class, and gender.  Thus, analysis of 
consent should not be simplistic and one-dimensional, addressing only 
subordination to authority analysis.  Rather, the analysis of consent should be 
nuanced and sophisticated, accounting for the different relations between two 
people. 
B.  Consent as a Legitimating Factor 
Consent is a legitimizing factor in that it makes police action legal.  
Accordingly, assuming no other exception applies, a warrantless search is 
unconstitutional unless there is consent.190 Consent changes the relationship 
between the parties and legitimizes otherwise illegal police action.191  Similarly, 
nonconsensual sexual intercourse is illegal rape.192 
Consent is what distinguishes a legal search from an invalid search and 
sexual intercourse from rape.  Some feminists argue that the law should not 
demand that the woman resist her rapist but rather that the man ask the 
woman’s permission.193  In terms of evidence, instead of requiring her to show 
that she fought back, he must show that she said yes.194  In the context of consent 
to search, Fourth Amendment law requires the state show that the third-party (or 
suspect) gave his or her consent rather than show that the police obtained a 
warrant.195  The police may pursue a consent search even when probable cause to 
 
 187.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006). 
 188.  Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 
18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671 (2009). 
 189.  For a power dynamic analysis of this case, see Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-
Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1 
(2010); Ross, supra note 20, at 30. 
 190.  For a description of exceptions, see generally Jones v. U.S., 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); U.S. v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 
(1948). 
 191.  For a discussion of consent as legally and morally transformative, see Larry Alexander, The 
Moral Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165 (1996); Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 
LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996). 
 192.  Moreover, in the case of a contract, consent is required in order to form a valid agreement, 
and lack of consent results in an unenforceable agreement. 
 193.  See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 777 (1988); Robin D. Wiener, Shifting the Communication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in 
Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 143 (1983). 
 194.  See Chamallas, supra note 193; Wiener, supra note 193. 
 195.  See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (stating, “[w]hen a prosecutor seeks 
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support a search warrant exists.196  In addition, the police do not need to explain 
to the individual that he or she has the right to refuse to give consent.197  Rather 
than meaningfully examining the police use of power, the court readily assumes 
the consent of the individual. 
In this context, as in the rape context, the burden placement is crucial.  To 
place the responsibility for deciding not to consent on the citizen is to privilege 
police power.  By ignoring police power over the citizen and viewing police and 
the citizen as equals bargaining at arm’s length, the waiver of constitutional 
rights is seen as legitimate.  In this way, the contractual perception of consent 
veils power imbalances between the police and the citizen.  Furthermore, placing 
the burden on the citizen to refuse or deny consent deepens the imbalance of 
power. 
The law views the citizen as controlling the situation by deciding whether to 
refuse consent or allow it.  Instead, the law could place the burden on the police 
to prove they did not misuse their power.198  As the law stands, the suspect bears 
responsibility for either giving or refusing consent to the search.199  This ignores 
the power imbalance between the police and the consenting individual.  The 
power-blind rhetoric analysis200 clarifies why the legitimating aspect of consent 
privileges the police over the citizen.  As Professor Raymond argues: 
[Fourth Amendment law p]lace[s] the responsibility to protect rights on the 
defendants themselves. . . . [T]he loss of rights is understood as the product of 
defendant-centered decisions like consent, compliance, or voluntary cooperation 
rather than police conduct. . . .  [B]ecause the result is the product of the 
defendant’s own choices, the outcome is both reasonable and adequately 
protective of individual rights . . . .  [T]he courts and the government advocate 
for the view that reasonable people can and should decline to cooperate with 
police.  Moreover, it suggests that the smart defendant . . . invokes that right and 
refuses cooperation.  The cooperator winds up portrayed as a fool or a sucker, 
someone who foolishly but willingly relinquished his right to be left alone. . . .  
[T]he model causes the courts . . . to focus on questions of how individuals 
should behave rather than how police should . . . . While claiming . . . to focus on 
how the reasonable person would feel under the circumstances, many courts in 
fact look to whether police, in their view, have behaved appropriately, or to 
 
to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the 
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given”) (internal citation omitted). 
 196.  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177.  See Marshall’s dissent arguing that only exigent 
circumstances would justify a warrantless search, otherwise the police needs to get a warrant.  United 
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See Douglas’s dissent arguing that, 
because the police had an opportunity to obtain a search warrant but failed to do so, the consensual 
search was invalid.  Rebecca Strauss, We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to 
Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 868, 877 (2002). 
 197.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1973). 
 198.  See Gregory S. Fisher, Search and Seizure, Third-Party Consent: Rethinking Police Conduct and 
the Fourth Amendment, 66 WASH. L. REV. 189 (1991) (asserting that the court should focus on police 
conduct and require police to justify their reliance on third-party consent). 
 199.  The Supreme Court also puts the burden on the citizen in that he or she may limit the scope 
of the search.  See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991). 
 200.  See supra section IV.A. 
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whether there has been police overreaching.201 
Though Professor Raymond addresses the general law of consensual search, her 
critique is relevant to the specific case of third-party consent.  In third-party 
consent searches, as in other consensual searches, the Court disregards this 
legitimating nature of consent.  The Court’s neutral analysis disregards the 
possibility that even when the police do not abuse their power, voluntary 
consent might not be truly given.  In consensual search cases, 
[The courts] view[] defendants’ loss of rights as their own responsibility. . . . [I]n 
the ordinary course, reasonable people have—and believe that they have—the 
right to disregard the police, ignore their requests, and refuse to cooperate with 
them.  Compliance with police thus becomes the product not of compulsion or 
submission to police authority, but of individual acquiescence. . . . [C]ooperators 
should blame their loss of constitutional rights on their own foolish desire to 
engage in cooperative and socially appropriate behavior.202 
Fourth Amendment law aims to limit state power and protect citizens from 
unwarranted state intrusion.203  However, Fourth Amendment law currently 
privileges the police instead of empowering the individuals.  This inequality of 
power is not cured by requiring the police to notify the citizen that he or she has 
the right to disallow the police’s search:204 
Waivers . . .will not cure the broader problem of police coercion. . . . Scholars 
who focus on the lack of knowledge as if that were the sole problem in consent 
searches miss the point.  Lack of knowledge is just one indicator of the 
individual’s lack of power.  It is a relatively small issue within the broader 
problem of coercion. . . it would be misleading to tell individuals that they can 
withhold consent, for that implies that there will be no negative repercussions 
from telling the officer to leave them alone, when in fact, police may search 
and/or arrest nonconsenting individuals in many instances even after the 
suspect has manifested nonconsent. . . . The warning changes nothing.  The 
officer still holds all the cards.  He can arrest; he can retaliate for citizens who fail 
to consent; he can become violent.  All a waiver would do where the person truly 
feels coerced is mask the coercion.  The lack of knowledge requirement should be 
understood as part of a general disregard for the power differential between 
police and suspect and part of search law’s project to dislocate the legal concept 
of coercion from the experience of the person facing police pressure.205 
 
 201.  Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply: Challenging the 
Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 1484–86 (2007). 
 202.  Id. at 1530. 
 203.  See U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 204.  See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  See also Steven L. Chanenson, Get the Facts Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing 
Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 TENN. L. REV. 399 (2004); Morgan Cloud, Ignorance and 
Democracy, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1143 (2007); Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1171 (2007); Gerald E. Lynch, Why Not a Miranda for Searches?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
233 (2007); Matthew Phillips, Effective Warnings Before Consent Searches: Practical, Necessary, And 
Desirable, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185 (2008). 
 205.  Ross, supra note 20, at 35–37. See also Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the 
Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 203–06. 
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 After consenting (and after Sergeant Murray started conducting the search 
pursuant to her consent), Ms. Randolph withdrew her consent,206 yet her consent 
would have justified the search had the present Mr. Randolph not objected to the 
search.207  The dissent validated the consensual search notwithstanding her 
change of mind.208  The majority, on the other hand, did not use her revocation as 
grounds to invalidate the search.209  The Supreme Court viewed consent as a 
static, rather than a dynamic, process.  Once consent is given, there is no 
possibility of retraction; irrevocable permission is granted and a change of mind 
has no meaning.  Thus, the Supreme Court disregards later revocation of consent 
as irrelevant.  The Court should have raised questions such as: Can a person 
withdraw her consent after the search has started?  At what point in time may a 
person no longer change her mind?  Is there such a time limit?  At the same time, 
if a person refuses consent, the police may keep asking his or her permission, the 
previous objection notwithstanding.  Consent given after many refusals is still 
valid consent.  The Supreme Court looks at a specific point in time where consent 
was granted and freezes that moment in time.  Thus, consent is not changing and 
evolving but stable and frozen.  This static notion of consent, like the court’s 
disregard of police power, privileges the police. 
V.  THE DYNAMIC BETWEEN THE POLICE OFFICER AND THE SUSPECT 
This part explores the dynamic between the police officer and the suspect 
(the defendant).  Generally, the suspect gives his consent to the search when 
asked by the police officer.210  However, in third-party consent to search cases the 
suspect does not consent; rather, the police officer obtains the other tenant’s 
consent to the search.211  Examining this edge of the triangle through the lenses of 
textual analysis and feminist literature on consent, this Part makes two 
interrelated arguments.  First, the Supreme Court’s analysis of consent is a-
contextual.  In examining consent the Supreme Court disregards the 
circumstances and conditions under which consent is given and applies the same 
rule to different situations.  Specifically, the Supreme Court applies the same rule 
when a third-party consents and when the suspect consents to the search212 and 
thus reveals its indifference to who gave his or her consent to the search.  Second, 
the Supreme Court constructs consent as a private and personal decision of the 
individual.213  Thus, the public, political, societal, and constitutional aspects of 
consent are veiled.  By framing the waiver of the constitutional privacy right as a 
 
 206.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006). 
 207. Id. 
 208.  Id. at 127–43 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 209.  See id. at 122–23 (holding that the physically present co-occupant’s objection to the search 
rendered the consent invalid). 
 210.  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 211.  See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731(1969).  
See also supra Part II. 
 212.  See, e.g., Matlock, 415 U.S. 164; Frazier, 294 U.S. 731.  See also supra Part II. 
 213.  See infra Part V.B. 
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private and nonpublic issue, the Supreme Court blurs the line between the 
private and the public. 
While these claims are relevant to all consensual searches, they are more 
acute in third-party consent to search cases, as stressed throughout this Article.  
In all consent to search cases there is a waiver of the right to privacy, but in third-
party consent to search cases it is the consent of one occupant that waives the 
constitutional right of the other occupant.  Such cases are unique in that the 
consent of one person is deemed enough to waive the constitutional right of 
another person.  The consent of a third-party justifies this intrusion of privacy. 
This edge of the triangle—the relationship between the police officer and 
suspect—is relevant regardless of the suspect’s physical presence or absence.  In 
cases like Randolph, where the two occupants are present, this dynamic is clearly 
important.  Moreover, this relationship is significant even in cases of an absent 
suspect because both the police and the third-party inherently consider the 
suspect’s interests. 
A.  A-Contextualized Analysis of Consent 
In his concurring opinion in Randolph, Justice Breyer emphasizes that “the 
Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules.  Rather, it recognizes 
that no single set of legal rules can capture the ever-changing complexity of 
human life.  It consequently uses the general terms ‘unreasonable searches and 
seizures.’”214  Additionally, the Supreme Court has continuously emphasized 
that “[r]easonableness . . . is measured . . . by examining the totality of the 
circumstances.”215  Despite these assertions, the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
consent is insensitive to circumstances and context. 
The Supreme Court applies the same analysis of consent in third-party 
consent cases that it applies in other consensual search cases.  Consent justifies 
the search, whether given by the suspect or by another occupant.216  Each co-
tenant has the authority to give consent.217  The opinion of the other occupant is 
only relevant when he is physically present and objecting to the search.218  If he is 
outside the home, or even sleeping in another room, then his objection holds no 
weight.  Generally, the third-party’s consent justifies the search even assuming 
that the absent suspect would have objected to the search if he was present.  The 
opinion of the suspect is relevant and overrides the consent of the other occupant 
only if there is disputed consent among two present occupants.219 
The Randolph dissent critiques the majority’s rule as arbitrary, stating that it 
 
 214.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 215. Id. (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).  See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (arguing that “the question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ 
or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined 
from the totality of all the circumstances”). 
 216.  Matlock, 415 U.S. at 177.  See also supra Part II. 
 217.  Id.  See also supra Part II. 
 218.  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
 219.  Id. 
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depends on whether the occupant was lucky enough to be present or not.220  
Disregarding the opinion of the occupant (except in the specific situation of a 
physically present objecting occupant) demonstrates the Supreme Court’s a-
contextualized analysis.  This a-contextual analysis misses an important fact for 
evaluating consent.  Third-party consent to search differs from a suspect’s 
consent to search.  Only in the former is the consent of one used against another.  
The search results are not to the detriment of the consenting co-occupant but to 
the detriment of the other co-occupant.  By ignoring this difference, the Supreme 
Court excludes a relevant fact from its analysis.  As discussed in the previous 
Parts, the Court ignores other relevant facts as well, such as the race and gender 
of the consenter221 and the power imbalance between the police and the 
individual.222 
Fourth Amendment law as stated by the Supreme Court is a-contextual in 
that it prescribes a general rule that does not consider specific circumstances.  
The Randolph decision uses the general word “occupant.”223  The Supreme 
Court’s analysis ignores the relationship between the occupants and applies the 
same rule to couples, blood relatives,224 and roommates.225  Justice Souter 
specifically mentions that the same rule applies to all residential co-occupants.226  
However, in Randolph, as in most cases relied on by the Supreme Court, the 
consenting occupant is a wife or girlfriend and the objecting occupant is her 
husband or boyfriend.227  The Supreme Court applies the same blanket rule 
whether the police officer is searching a house,228 bureau drawers, a bag,229 a 
 
 220.  Id. at 137 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 221.  See supra section III.A. 
 222.  See supra section IV.A. 
 223.  The Court also uses the terms “tenants,” “residents,” “co-inhabitants,” “individuals,” and 
“persons.”  See generally id. 
 224.  Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
 225.  See Illya Lichtenberg, The Bus Sweep Controversy: Agency, Authority and the Unresolved Issues of 
Third Party Consent, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 145 (2004) (examining a case in which a bus driver is 
the third-party); Martha E. Lipchitz, Constitutional Law: Third-Party Consent to Seizure of Taxicab 
Passenger Does Not Violate Passenger’s Fourth Amendment Rights, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 423 (2001) (also 
examining a case in which a taxicab driver is the third-party); Steven R. Morrison, The Fourth 
Amendment’s Applicability to Residents of Homeless Shelters, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 319 (2009) (examining a 
case in which a homeless shelter staff is the third-party); Andrew M. Souder, Bargaining Away Fourth 
Amendment Rights in Labor Dispute Resolution: Bolden v. SEPTA (1991), 38 VILL. L. REV. 1133 (1993) 
(examining a case in which an employee union consented to drug testing of member employees); 
Margaret R. Sweeney, United States v. Woodrum, Beware Taxicab Passengers, Your Individual Rights Are 
Being Diminished, 28 N.E. J. CRIM. & CIV. CON. 123 (2002) (examining a case in which a taxicab driver is 
the third-party). 
 226.  Georgia v Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006).  But see Russell M. Gold, Is This Your Bedroom?: 
Reconsidering Third-Party Consent Searches Under Modern Living Arrangements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
375 (2008). 
 227.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107 (noting that Mr. and Ms. Randolph were separated but Ms. 
Randolph returned to the marital house for either reconciliation or to retrieve her belongings).  See 
also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (noting that Ms. Graff and Mr. Matlock were living 
together); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (noting that Mr. Rodriguez and Ms. Fischer were 
living together); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 228.  See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 
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car,230 a locker, or a computer.231  The dissent goes even further and treats sharing 
information,232 papers, documents, containers, or places the same.233 The 
Randolph majority characterizes this as a “false equation”234 and criticizes the 
dissent for failing to acknowledge the importance of the privacy of the home.  
However, the majority’s analysis of consent also disregards the context in which 
consent was given.  The dissent, like the majority, ignores the special 
circumstances of third-party consent.  In other words, both the dissent and the 
majority treat third-party consent cases like any other consent to search cases and 
disregard the nonconsenting co-occupant/police side of the triangle. 
In Randolph, the police came to the home after Ms. Randolph called the 
police complaining about a domestic dispute she had with her husband.235  
However, the reason for the search is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis, as is the 
relationship between the two occupants.  The Supreme Court’s rule applies to all 
third-party consent to search cases, no matter what triggered the search.  The 
context of the search of a marital home within a marital relationship is absent 
from the Supreme Court’s opinion.236  In Randolph the search was triggered by 
Ms. Randolph and was conducted by Sergeant Murray pursuant to her 
consent.237  However, the search’s findings were used against Mr. Randolph in 
court.238  This special aspect of the triangle, the police-suspect relation, is absent 
from the court’s analysis. 
The Supreme Court also disregards the withdrawal of Ms. Randolph’s 
consent.239  After Ms. Randolph consented to the search, evidence of drug use 
was found.240  Sergeant Murray left the house to get an evidence bag from his car, 
but when he returned to the house Ms. Randolph withdrew her consent.241  
 
95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2010). 
 229.  Frazier, 394 U.S. 731. 
 230. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443.  See also Alex 
Chan, No, You May Not Search My Car! Extending Georgia v. Randolph To Vehicle Searches, 82 WASH. L. 
REV. 377 (2007). 
 231.  The court also compares computers to containers.  See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 
717 (10th Cir. 2007).  See also Noah Stacy, Apparent Third Party Authority and Computers: Ignorance of the 
Lock Is No Excuse, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1431 (2008). 
 232.  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 129 (1984). 
 233.  The language of the Fourth Amendment also groups together “persons, houses, papers and 
effects.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
 234.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006). 
 235.  Id. at 107. 
 236.  Compare id. with Heather L. Hanson, The Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Are We Really 
Being Reasonable?, 79 VA. L. REV. 243, 245 (1993) (stating that the Supreme Court considers context in a 
search of a place of employment), Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 581 (2011) (arguing that context should be considered in the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to information on the internet), and Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the 
Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39 (2011). 
 237.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
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Nevertheless, Sergeant Murray retrieved the evidence.242  Nowhere in the 
opinion did the Court consider the revocation of Ms. Randolph’s consent, and 
her change of heart did not invalidate her consent to the search.  The court did 
not question why she changed her mind or whether this should affect the 
validity of the search.  Perhaps Sergeant Murray should have again requested 
Mr. Randolph’s consent in order to proceed with the search once Ms. Randolph 
had withdrawn her consent. 
Some feminists suggest an alternative contextualized notion of consent.243  
This contextual consent relies on the nature of the human relationships involved, 
the complexity of human emotion, the power inequalities between the parties, 
and the social meanings of their actions, rather than on a universal notion 
identical under all circumstances.244  This notion of consent gives autonomy great 
weight and negates the Supreme Court’s assertion of a powerful social actor that 
knows what is best for, and therefore can take advantage of, the less powerful 
social actors.245  Additionally, the feminist notion of consent considers the 
experiences and values of women by engaging in practical reasoning that is 
sensitive to situation and context and by exploring social meaning as ways for 
exacerbating and exploiting power inequalities.246  Applying this feminist 
analysis to Randolph raises questions about how Ms. Randolph’s presence and 
consent affected the relations between Sergeant Murray and Mr. Randolph.  Not 
only did she trigger the search but she changed the situation from a 
nonconsensual search to a consensual one and from a consent by suspect case to 
a third-party consent case.  However, these circumstances are absent from the 
Randolph decision. 
B.  Consent as a Private Decision 
Scholars critique the consent to search exception and resulting 
diminishment of the constitutional right to privacy.247  The result of the Randolph 
 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning 
in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 40 (2002). 
 244.  Id. at 41–42, 49. 
 245.  Id. at 42–43. 
 246.  For a case-by-case analysis of third-party consent to search, see Stephen E. Henderson, 
Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of 
Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975 (2007) (rejecting a bright line rule); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning From 
All Fifty States: How To Apply The Fourth Amendment And Its State Analogs To Protect Third Party 
Information From Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 373 (2006) (cataloguing the Fourth 
Amendment and similar state doctrines). 
 247.  See Sharon E. Abrams, Third-Party Consent Searches, the Supreme Court, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 963 (1984); James A. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen by 
Supreme Court Justices: Are They Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413 
(1993); Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307 (1998); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth 
Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199 (1993); Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws 
in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002); Thomas Y. 
Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, 
Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. 
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decision is a strengthened constitutional right to privacy.248  Under the majority’s 
current rule, the police must stay out of a home because of the present tenant’s 
objection notwithstanding the invitation by the other occupant.249  The state may 
not invade the privacy of the home in such situations unless there is a warrant or 
exigent circumstances arise.250  The rule heightens the burden on the police to 
obtain the consent of the citizen before conducting a search. Between the two 
occupants the Court majority preferred the objecting occupant.  After scholars 
critiqued the consent to search exception and the weakening of the constitutional 
right to privacy, the latest Supreme Court decision seems to go in the direction of 
respecting and strengthening the Fourth Amendment right.251  Therefore, the 
Randolph court emphasizes the importance of the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy.252 
However, the dissent criticizes the majority’s rule for protecting social 
norms and expectations rather than privacy.253  According to Chief Justice 
Roberts, “The majority’s analysis alters a great deal of established Fourth 
Amendment law.  The majority imports the concept of “social expectations,” 
previously used only to determine when a search has occurred and whether a 
particular person has standing to object to a search, into questions of consent.”254 
In addition, the dissent believes that the majority’s rule aims to strengthen police 
 
REV. 1 (1991); Andrew Fiske, Disputed-Consent Searches: An Uncharacteristic Step Toward Reinforcing 
Defendants’ Privacy Rights, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 721 (2006); Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of 
Privacy, and the Meaning of “Searches” in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319 
(1984); David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74 DENV. U.L. REV. 941 
(1997); Nancy J. Kloster, An Analysis of the Gradual Erosion of the Fourth Amendment Regarding Voluntary 
Third Party Consent Searches: The Defendant’s Perspective, 72 N. DAK. L. REV. 99 (1996); Arnold H. 
Loewy, Cops, Cars, and Citizens: Fixing the Broken Balance, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 535; Tracey Maclin, The 
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993); Tracey Maclin, Justice 
Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723 (1992); Janice Nadler, No 
Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153; Daniel L. Rotenberg, 
An Essay On Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175 (1991); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The 
Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133 (2003); Brian J. Serr, 
Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583 (1989); 
David Alan Sklansky, ‘One Train May Hide Another’: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal 
Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875 (2008); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings 
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993); Douglas M. Smith, Comment, Ohio v. 
Robinette: Per Se Unreasonable, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 897 (1998); Brian A. Sutherland, Whether Consent 
to Searches Was Given Voluntary: A Statistical Analysis of Factors that Predict the Suppression Rulings of the 
Federal District Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.2192 (2006); Russell L. Weaver, The Myth of “Consent”,39 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 1195 (2007). 
 248.  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006).  See John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 1109 (2007); Renee E. Williams, Note, Third Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. 
Randolph: Dueling Approaches to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV. 937 (2007). 
 249.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 116–17. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Burkoff, supra note 248; Williams, supra note 248. 
 252.  Burkoff, supra note 248, at 1134. 
 253.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 136–37, 141 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 254.  Id. at 141. 
Gan Macro Edit_v2_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2012  5:00 PM 
336 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:303 2012 
 
power to fight crime by unburdening police action.255  Chief Justice Roberts 
states: 
Just as the source of the majority’s rule is not privacy, so too the interest it 
protects cannot reasonably be described as such . . . That the rule is so random in 
its application confirms that it bears no real relation to the privacy protected by 
the Fourth Amendment.  What the majority’s rule protects is not so much 
privacy as the good luck of a co-owner who just happens to be present at the 
door when the police arrive.256 
According to the dissent, the majority’s rule is arbitrary and does not protect the 
privacy of the suspect. At the same time, Justice Souter criticizes the dissent for 
not respecting the privacy of the home: 
In the principal dissent’s view, the centuries of special protection for the privacy 
of the home are over.  The dissent equates inviting the police into a co-tenant’s 
home over his contemporaneous objection with reporting a secret  . . . and the 
emphasis it places on the false equation suggests a deliberate intent to devalue 
the importance of the privacy of a dwelling place.  The same attitude that privacy 
of a dwelling is not special underlies the dissent’s easy assumption that privacy 
shared with another individual is privacy waived for all purposes including 
warrantless searches by the police.257 
According to Justice Souter, the importance of the privacy of the home deserves a 
special search rule. 
The Randolph decision is problematic not only because protecting privacy is 
simply a coincidental result of the decision. It is problematic also because consent 
is portrayed as a person’s personal and private decision with no constitutional, 
social, or political consequences and implications.  Both the dissent and the 
majority ignore these implications and treat privacy waiver as a personal and 
discretionary decision. 
Contrary to the court’s view of consent as a private decision, feminist 
literature on rape exposes the social aspects of consent.258  Because of these social 
aspects, rape can be viewed as a political rather than a personal issue.259  
According to Catharine MacKinnon, rape results from male social dominance 
rather than individual instances of nonconsensual sexual intercourse.260  Feminist 
literature describes rape as one aspect of women’s sexual vulnerability and 
exploitation under patriarchic society.261  MacKinnon argues that male sexual 
dominance results not only in rape but also in pornography, sexual harassment, 
 
 255.  Id. at 140–41 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 256.  Id. at 136–37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 257.  Id. at 115. 
 258.  See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). 
 259.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 258, at 93, 100; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, 
Method and Politics, in TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 258, at 106, 113. 
 260.   MACKINNON, Method and Politics, supra note 258, at 106, at 114. 
 261.  Id. 
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prostitution and trafficking.  Thus, the feminist aim is to reveal the public 
aspects, social consequences and political implications of rape.  Women’s consent 
to sex is viewed in the context of social constraints, women’s systemic inequality 
and subordination to men, and women’s powerlessness in patriarchal society.  
Women’s consent to sex is not isolated from social dynamics of power between 
women and men that still prevail in our society.  Similarly, because state power 
and a constitutional right are involved in police searches, the issue of consent 
holds political and public importance.  Like consent to sex, consent to search 
should be viewed in the context of broad social political dynamics.  In addition to 
consent’s gender and race aspects previously discussed,262 there is a political 
aspect of consent to search in terms of the constitutional right to privacy. 
In order to understand consent one must consider the public and 
constitutional aspects of the decision to consent as well as the political aspect of 
consent that results from the power dynamic between a state representative and 
an individual.  Searching the home has political implications (consider, for 
example, state intervention) and social implications (consider, for example, 
domestic violence) and thus raises public concerns and involves constitutional 
rights (the right to privacy). 
Viewing privacy as a right one can waive at his discretion justifies coercive 
police searches and privileges police power.  This view of the right to privacy 
also frames the right as a private issue and disregards its public implications.  
Justifying coercive searches and ignoring public implications of the right to 
privacy are interrelated: an apolitical analysis of consent veils not only the power 
dynamics but also the political and public aspects of the constitutional right to 
privacy.  Rather than centering its analysis on police abuse of power and police 
intrusion into the privacy of the home, the Supreme Court focuses on the 
citizen’s consent and waiver of privacy. 
Under current law, the right to privacy rests with the citizen.  He has 
discretion over how to use it and decides whether to claim it or waive it.  There is 
no mention of the public aspects of constitutional rights.  An individual decides 
whether to give consent or not and bears the consequences for his or her 
decision.  As long as privacy is waived, the search is justified and legitimate.  
Conversely, the police carry no responsibility at all and the Supreme Court 
disregards the fact that it is state action that triggered the waiver of privacy.  One 
can waive his right to privacy by telling another person a secret.  But in the case 
of a search, waving the right to privacy means opening the home to state 
intrusion.  These facts are absent from the Court’s decisions, which tell a story 
about a person cordially inviting the police inside.  Excluding this element allows 
the Supreme Court to conclude that consent is a discretionary, private process.  
The use of the term “visitor”263 not only veils the power imbalance between the 
individual and police officer but also portrays consent as a civil and private 
interaction.  This ignores the public and political elements of consent. 
By viewing consent to search as a private decision, the Supreme Court blurs 
 
 262.  See supra section IV.A. 
 263.  See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111–12 (2006). 
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the line between private and public264 and categorizes a state-individual 
interaction as private.  It veils the fact that police search is not a private matter 
but a public matter.  It is performed by a state representative using his state 
power and leads to a state trial.  If consent was simply private, it would not 
involve an infringement of a constitutional right.265  The constitution protects 
public values and civil rights. 
Current consent law is problematic not only in its ignorance of the power 
dynamics between citizen and police and state intervention in the privacy of the 
home, but also in its blurring of the line between personal and public spheres.266  
While feminist critiques of Fourth Amendment law focus on other dichotomies 
(objective-subjective, victim-agent, consent-coercion),267 this is yet another 
binary: the private-public dichotomy.  The home is considered a sacred, private 
place268 while the police unmistakably embody the public sphere.  Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court views the police invasion of the privacy of the home as a 
private issue.  Rather than recognizing the political aspects of this situation, the 
Supreme Court shifts the line dividing the private from the public.  In doing so, 
the Court reduces the sense of privacy that citizens have in their homes and 
diminishes their protection against state intervention into that privacy.  Viewing 
the right to privacy as something an individual can waive, like viewing the 
police search as a civil visit, shifts the search into the private sphere. 
The line between private and public is apparent in other areas.  Viewing 
consent to search as a “private” decision is different than the right to make 
private decisions (for example, the right to decide to have an abortion269 or to use 
contraceptives270).  These private decisions evolve the right towards being free 
 
 264.  See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992); 
Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 319 (1993); Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUB. AND 
PRIVATE IN SOC. LIFE 281 (1983) (describing the private/public dichotomy). 
 265.  See Sam Kamin, The Private is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in Defining the Fourth 
Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83 (2004) (detailing invasion of privacy by private actors and the intrusion 
of privacy by governmental agents); Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461 (2010) (reconciling the tension between individual liberties and 
public interests in Fourth Amendment law). 
 266.  See Donald R. C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the Fourth Amendment’s Public/Private 
Distinction: An Opportunity For Clarity, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1191 (1985). 
 267.  Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 61; Raigrodski, Reasonableness and 
Objectivity, supra note 105.  See also Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456 (1996) (detailing the procedure/substances 
dichotomy); George E. Dix, What is the Proper Role of “Purpose” Analysis to Measure the Reasonableness of 
a Search or Seizure?: Subjective “Intent” as a Component of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J. 
373 (2006) (detailing the subjective/objective dichotomy); Donald L. Doernberg, “The Right of the 
People:” Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under The Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
259 (1983) (detailing the individual/collective dichotomy); Kit Kinports, Criminal Law: Criminal 
Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71 (2007) (detailing the subjective/objective 
dichotomy). 
 268.  See, e.g., Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115. 
 269. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 270. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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from state intervention when making such intimate decisions.  Additionally, this 
private decision to consent to search is not the same as the privacy found within 
one’s home (for example, to engage in homosexual sex in the privacy of one’s 
home271).  Feminists argue that treating the home as a private sphere shields 
batterers and justifies the lack of protection of domestic abuse victims.272  
Similarly, treating consent as a private decision within the discretion of 
individuals frames police power and intervention as a nonpolitical issue. 
The notion of consent as a private, apolitical issue is especially acute in cases 
of third-party consent where one occupant waives his co-occupant’s right to 
privacy.  According to the Supreme Court, private information easily becomes 
public: by the mere sharing of information or the home with another occupant, 
one occupant’s private realm becomes public upon the other occupant’s action.273  
The discretion of the occupant will transform what was private into a public 
domain open to police scrutiny.  Thus, a co-occupant cannot control or limit the 
access to the information or the house once either is shared.  As Justice Marshall 
explains: 
That such [third-party consent] searches do not give rise to claims of 
constitutional violations rests . . . on the premise that a person may voluntarily 
limit his expectation of privacy by allowing others to exercise authority over his 
possessions. . . . What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. . . . Thus, an 
individual’s decision to permit another “joint access [to] or control [over the 
property] for most purposes” . . .limits that individual’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy and to that extent limits his Fourth Amendment protections. . . . If an 
individual has not so limited his expectation of privacy, the police may not 
dispense with the safeguards established by the Fourth Amendment.274 
Thus, the mere sharing of the house reduces one’s privacy and justifies police 
search. 
The consent of the co-occupant exposes the privacy of the home to the 
police without the permission of the suspect.  Waiving a constitutional right of 
the suspect is easy and automatic, as the house may be searched at the discretion 
of his co-occupant.  By the mere sharing of a house (or property or information) 
one loses control over the right to privacy.  His constitutional right is subject to 
the discretion of his co-occupant.  A private home becomes public and exposed 
to state intervention by the mere fact of shared living.  To maintain his privacy, a 
person should have a separate place, away from the reach (or awareness) of the 
other tenant.275 
In addition, the difference between consensual searches and searches based 
on warrants demonstrates that viewing consent as private is problematic.276  In 
 
 271. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 272.  SUK, supra note 114; Tuerkheimer, supra note 114. 
 273. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 110–11; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189–90 (1990). 
 274. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 189–90. 
 275. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135. 
 276.  See Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs In The Balance: Resurrecting The Warrant 
Gan Macro Edit_v2_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 7/29/2012  5:00 PM 
340 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 19:303 2012 
 
earlier cases, the searches were held legal because the suspect (or his co-tenant) 
waived his constitutional right to privacy, not because a judge issued a warrant 
based on evidence justifying police intrusion.277  As Justice Scalia states, “The 
Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home, 
whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects . . . . The prohibition 
does not apply, however, to situations in which voluntary consent has been 
obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched . . . or from a 
third party who possesses common authority over the premises.”278  Thus, in 
consensual search cases the court does not examine the justification of the search 
ex ante, but only ex post when the defendant challenges the legality of the 
evidence’s acquisition.  For example, the Rodriguez dissent recognizes the 
importance of a constitutional rights waiver that mandates a warrant unless 
exigent circumstances exist.279  The legal process of obtaining a warrant protects 
the constitutional rights of the suspects, whereas in consensual searches the 
suspect’s constitutional rights are waived without such protection.  According to 
the Rodriguez majority, consent is the private, personal decision of the citizen.280  
Unlike consensual searches, searches pursuant to a warrant are publicly 
scrutinized by a judge who considers and approves the search ahead of time.281  
By not preferring a warrant-based search over a consensual search, the Supreme 
Court blurs the private-public line and bases a large percentage of searches on 
the discretion of the consenting citizen, thus categorizing it as a private matter. 
The Randolph decision views consent as a private decision.  This result 
ignores the political and public aspects of consent and blurs the line between 
private and public spheres.  This narrow view of consent is problematic because 
 
Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531 (1997); Rebecca Strauss, We Can 
Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way: The Use of Deceit to Induce Consent Searches, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
868 (2002) (discussing the difference between consent searches and warrant searches).  See also Craig 
M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendments, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985); Thomas Y. Davies, 
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999); Randolph E. Sundby, A Return 
to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988) 
(discussing the relationship between the warrant clause and the reasonable test in Fourth 
Amendment law). 
 277.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181. 
 278. Id. 
 279.  Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 280.  See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181. 
 281.  Id. at 190 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 64–77 
(1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1–45 
(1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097 
(1998); Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 53 (1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1175–81 (1991) (arguing that 
Fourth Amendment law does not prefer searches pursuant to a warrant).  But see Tracey Maclin, 
When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Carol S. 
Steiker, Second Thoughts about First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994); David E. Steinberg, An 
Original Misunderstanding: Akhil Amar and Fourth Amendment History, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 227 (2005); 
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it veils important aspects of consent and makes state intervention legitimate 
upon the discretion of the individual. 
VI.  ABOLITION OF THIRD-PARTY CONSENT TO SEARCH DOCTRINE 
In opposition to the narrow Supreme Court analysis of consent in third-
party consent to search cases, consent must be viewed as a political and social 
decision (rather than a private one) and as a decision that is influenced by power 
dynamics.  Consent is socially constructed and influenced by gender and race.282  
Moreover, consent is dynamic; it changes and evolves over time, yet the current 
consent doctrine depicts it as static.  Exploring the perception of consent in third-
party consent to search cases shows that the Supreme Court adopts a 
problematic and underdeveloped notion of consent.  Consent is a more complex 
and nuanced phenomenon than the Supreme Court’s analysis acknowledges.  A 
better understanding of consent must ensure that the individual’s consent is 
meaningful and voluntary.  A contextual, gender- and race-conscious notion of 
consent that accounts for the relationships between the two occupants and the 
police will be more realistic and more accurate.  Taking into account context, 
gender, and race when examining consent will more accurately reflect the 
experience of the consenting individual.  A more sophisticated notion of consent 
will also preserve citizens’ autonomy, privacy, and dignity.283  A rich notion of 
consent that acknowledges power dynamics better protects individuals against 
coercive searches and ensures that consent is freely and voluntarily given. 
But what will the alternative notion of consent look like?  How will consent 
work in practice?  How can a court account for power dynamics, gender, race, 
and societal constructions?  What will a meaningful and truly voluntary notion 
of consent (as opposed to un-coerced) look like?  How can consent protect both 
individuals’ autonomy and agency while accounting for social inequalities?  
How can the court examine the subjective understandings of the individual? 
In the context of rape law, feminist scholars suggest either redefining 
consent from a women’s point of view284 or abandoning consent altogether285 so 
that the definition of rape will not include a consent component.286  These two 
approaches are applicable to current consent to search doctrine.  Some scholars 
want to redefine consent so that it focuses on the suspect’s perspective rather 
 
 282.  See supra Part III. 
 283.  See John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under The Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655 
(2008). 
 284.  See Melanie A. Beres, “Spontaneous” Sexual Consent: An Analysis of Sexual Consent Literature, 
17 FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY 93 (2007). 
 285.  Victor Tadros, Rape Without Consent, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 515 (2006).  See also CHOICE 
AND CONSENT: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW AND SUBJECTIVITY (Rosemary Hunter & Sharon 
Cowan eds., 2007) (debating whether to reconstruct consent or replace it with a different concept, 
how to respect women’s autonomy and equality and at the same time to take into account social 
structure inequalities, how to break away from the victim/agent dichotomy, and how to give a 
contextualized account of women’s choices and consent). 
 286.  For feminist literature on consent, see generally CHOICE AND CONSENT, supra note 285. 
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than the reasonableness of the police action.287  Judging by the experience of rape 
doctrine reform efforts, adoption of a subjective test might lead to a 
condemnatory evaluation of the suspect’s conduct.288  Though the scholars that 
advocate for this redefinition of consent are careful to point out that the courts 
should not blame the suspects for their deeds or scrutinize their behavior, the 
experience of feminist rape doctrine reform leaves little room for optimism.289  
Even though rape laws were changed pursuant to feminist activism, courts still 
apply gender stereotypes, cultural conventions about sex, and rape myths.  
When examining a rape victim’s behavior, courts apply gender and heterosexual 
norms.  Additionally, rape victims who do not act like the court assumes a real 
rape victim is supposed to act are harshly judged and disbelieved by the courts.  
Judges still frequently see women as responsible for being assaulted because they 
engage in risk and not protect themselves.290  While reconstruction of consent is a 
valuable project, the possibility that courts will evaluate and criticize suspects’ 
conduct is cause for hesitation.  Thus, this redefinition of consent might 
disadvantage women and minorities rather than empower them. 
In addition to the risk of wrongfully blaming the suspect, a subjective 
notion of consent bears the risk of perpetuating gender and race stereotypes.  
Determining the subjective individual’s perspective should not lead to 
employing gender stereotypical views.  In interpreting the individual’s subjective 
perspective of consent, courts might apply gender and race biases to interpret the 
story told by the individual.  Again, in this way the alternative consent doctrine 
would work to the detriment of women.  Rather than empowering them, consent 
would reinforce patriarchic gender norms.  If a court invalidates consent because 
of the power imbalance between the consenting individual and the police, it 
might be seen as perpetuating stereotypes of women as weak, in need of 
protection, and without the ability to consent.291  Protecting women might be 
 
 287.  See Raigrodski, Consent Engendered, supra note 103, at 61; Raigrodski, Reasonableness and 
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 288.  See, e.g., SUSAN EHRLICH, REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL CONSENT (2001); 
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Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865 (2008) (noting that, in spite of the changes in 
rape law, courts still harshly judge women as risky). 
 290.  See, e.g., Regina A. Schuller, Blake M. McKimmie, Barbara M. Masser & Marc A. 
Klippenstine, Judgments of Sexual Assault: The Impact of Complainant Emotional Demeanor, Gender, and 
Victim Stereotypes, 13 NEW CRIM. L. R. 759 (2010); Morrison Torrey, When Will We be Believed? Rape 
Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013 (1991). 
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seen as a sign of their vulnerability and victimhood, and it might wrongly be 
interpreted to mean that men cannot rely on women’s consent.  Disregarding 
women’s consent because of power imbalances might lead to the absurd result 
that women can never give valid consent.  The new consent doctrine would thus 
portray women as infantile beings unable to consent, disregard their autonomy 
and expressed wishes, and effectively disempower them.292  Maintaining a 
balance between recognition of women’s agency and recognition of their 
vulnerability under societal constraints is a difficult task.  Feminists have not yet 
struck a balance between respecting women’s autonomy and protecting them 
from social inequalities.293 
In addition to these concerns, scholars advocating reform of the notion of 
consent present a vague redefinition of consent.294  Because the new definition is 
unclear, it is hard to see how courts will implement the new consent.  How will 
the courts find subjective consent and how will they apply anti-subordination 
and empowerment in their analysis?  The proposal to consider power dynamics 
by basing the notion of consent on anti-subordination and autonomy is 
appealing.  Indeed, these scholars present a powerful critique of the court’s 
ignorance of power dynamics and gender and race inequalities. However, this 
vague redefinition seems hard for courts to implement.  Consider, for example, 
Professor Ross’s approach.295  She proposes using a victim’s perspective and 
viewing consent as a subjective question.296  Additionally, she argues that 
autonomy and privacy should be the core goals of the consent doctrine.297  
However, other than providing these general guidelines, she does not give a 
specific and clear redefinition of consent.  She gives only a vague and general 
description of consent analysis, and it is not clear how to translate her guidelines 
into a workable definition for courts to apply. 
Professor Raigrodski’s approach is similarly unclear.298  She suggests 
abandoning objective reasonableness standards and adopting principles of anti-
subordination and empowerment instead.299  Then, consent doctrine would 
reflect the power dynamics between police and individuals.300  Raigrodski 
advocates a doctrine-based multiperspectival Fourth Amendment law that takes 
into account multiple viewpoints.301  However, the only guidance she offers 
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judges or lawyers is a methodology of narratives.302  She does not propose a 
clearly workable redefinition of consent.  Thus, the redefinition of consent is 
difficult in practice. 
In addition, such a standard of consent poses difficulties for police.  While 
fighting crime, the police will have to rely on subjective notions of consent.  
Feminist authors acknowledge that their redefinition of consent puts a higher 
burden on police than current Fourth Amendment law.303  However, they do not 
address the possibility that their proposals will diminish the police’s power to 
fulfill their duties.304  Police need an easy-to-operate rule rather than a 
complicated and nuanced formula.  In order to quickly and efficiently investigate 
crimes, respond to calls, and prevent crime, the police need clear guidelines.  A 
redefinition of consent needs to balance the constitutional right to privacy on one 
hand and the police’s ability to perform its assigned tasks on the other.  Thus, 
both the courts and the police will face difficulties in implementing the feminist 
redefinition of consent. 
The proposal to completely abolish the current consent exception is radical 
and impractical.305  However, abandoning only third-party consent doctrine 
appears a less extreme and more plausible solution.306  The triangular relation 
analysis highlights the difference between third-party consent to search and 
other consent searches.  As the triangle metaphor highlights, third-party consent 
to search cases involve relations between not two but three people.  These cases 
star not only a police officer and a suspect, but also a tripartite relationship.  
Furthermore, the notion of consent to search is more problematic in third-party 
consent cases than in other consent cases.  In the former, it is one co-tenant giving 
consent to the detriment of the other co-tenant.  These differences demonstrate 
that eliminating the third-party consent doctrine makes a smaller and more 
modest change to Fourth Amendment law than elimination of consensual 
searches all together.  This alternative approach strengthens the privacy and 
autonomy of the suspects without compromising rule of law.  Only the suspect 
can permit a search in which evidence found will be used against him.  The other 
occupant cannot allow a police search in order to gather evidence to be used 
against the suspect.  Needless to say, the third-party could still deliver the 
incriminating evidence to the police on her own initiative or tell the police what 
she knows to help them obtain a warrant, as Justice Souter suggested.307  In 
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addition, police can still acquire a warrant. 
Under Randolph, the objection of the physically present suspect overrides 
the consent of the third-party.308  The proposal to abolish third-party consent 
furthers this holding by preferring the suspect’s consent over the third-party’s 
consent.  This proposal also eliminates the possibility that the police might 
manipulate Randolph’s rule.309  As the law stands, the police can obtain third-
party consent by removing the suspect from the home or by waiting until the 
suspect is out of the home before initiating the search, relying on third-party 
consent.  Abolishing third-party consent will discourage such misuse of police 
power.  No doubt setting aside third-party consent means less consensual 
searches.  But even without third-party consent doctrine, Fourth Amendment 
law still leaves police many grounds under which to search.  Therefore, this 
proposal properly balances respecting the right to privacy and enabling police 
work. 
As shown in this Article, the Court applies a problematic and 
unsophisticated notion of consent.  In the context of third-party consent to search 
(as in the context of rape law) the court struggles to truly grasp the meaning of 
consent.  In spite of the Court’s efforts to understand consent, it is a vague 
concept, difficult to define and apply in a court of law.  Similarly, the vast legal 
scholarship on consent, though innovative and rigorous, is lacking in clarity.310  
The feminist alternative of consent is provocative and original but still not fully 
developed.311  Hence, abandoning third-party consent doctrine altogether is 
preferable to redefinition.  Critiquing the current notion of consent is important, 
yet the alternative redefinition of consent remains underdeveloped and 
unclear.312  Thus, this Article advocates for the elimination of the third-party 
consent to search doctrine.  This will enable a balance to be struck between the 
feminist concerns and abolition of the consent to search doctrine.  Limitation of 
this doctrine, albeit a moderate change, will strengthen the privacy and 
autonomy of individuals. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a new way to analyze the third-party consent to 
search doctrine through a triangle relation concept.  By analyzing Supreme Court 
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cases on searches of the home, the Article examines the third-party consent 
doctrine through the dynamics between the three actors: the consenting occupant 
(the third-party); the other occupant (the suspect); and the police officer.  The 
Article explores the relations between the two occupants,313 the relations between 
the consenting third-party and the police officer,314 and the relations between the 
suspect (the defendant) and police officer.315 
The Article critically analyzes the Supreme Court’s rhetoric and the notion 
of consent developed by the Court.  Looking to feminist scholarship on consent 
in the context of consent to search, this Article argues that the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of consent is a-contextual, gender-blind, and insensitive to power 
dynamics.  In addition, the Supreme Court proffers an apolitical and 
individualistic notion of consent that ignores the relations between the three 
actors.  The Supreme Court views consent as a private decision which has no 
effect on—and is unaffected by—its social surroundings.316  Thus, the Court 
gives the police power over individuals and, as a result, diminishes the right to 
privacy. 
Based on these insights, this Article concludes that, as used today by the 
Supreme Court, consent is an underdeveloped concept that justifies police 
coercion and legitimizes submission to police power by relabeling the 
submission “consent.”  At the same time, feminists’ alternative redefinition of 
consent is still vague and unclear.  However, this does not necessarily lead to the 
pessimistic view that consent is a meaningless and unworkable concept that 
should be abandoned.  Rather, abolishing consensual searches altogether is 
radical and unrealistic.  Thus, this Article suggests eliminating third-party 
consent to search doctrine.  The triangular relation analysis highlights this 
doctrine’s divergence from other consensual searches.  The analysis also reveals 
why the problematic features of consent are more acute in third-party consent to 
search cases.  Limiting the consent to search exception has the benefit of 
respecting autonomy and the right to privacy while not putting too high a 
burden on the police.  Eliminating third-party consent to search doctrine will 
successfully balance the feminist concerns about matrices of power and the need 
to preserve a useful concept of law. 
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